

# THE MINORITY OF ONE

Independent Monthly Publication, Dedicated to the Elimination of All Thought Restrictions Except for the Truth

*"There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad."*—GEORGE ORWELL

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November, 1961

## "Armed for Peace and War"

# To Talk Is Not Necessarily to Negotiate

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The Berlin crisis developed along peculiarly illogical lines. It was occasioned by the Soviet Government's determined, if by no means new, demand for international negotiations. Chairman Khrushchev reiterated in advance that in such negotiations the interests of the Western powers would be respected and upheld. His demand for negotiations was interpreted by American spokesmen as a crisis, a danger, a threat of a thermonuclear war. If a demand for negotiations can be interpreted as bellicosity, then, within such a frame of reference, military action is a peace-serving activity.

President Kennedy provided the "logical" bridge between the demand for international negotiations and the interpretation of it as a provocative act. He has emphatically identified the Soviet demand for a legal reform of the status of Berlin as a war provocation. According to this theory, only those who are determined to perpetuate the prevailing state of affairs, however bad, abnormal and irritating, are dedicated to peace. In actuality, a refusal to make legal adjustments to factual changes, may well precipitate a war situation. The only way to prevent international controversies from becoming war situations is to negotiate. Nor is it immoral or provocative for a government to *press* another government into negotiations. Rather, to refuse to negotiate problems that need to be resolved is tantamount to provoking international dangers.

Yet, this is the diplomatic technique we have adopted not only with regard to the Berlin problem, but also with regard to Laos, the admission of China to the United

Nations, summitry and other questions. The method consists of the circular rotation of diplomatic stages. First we refuse to negotiate. When our adversaries become impatient and start pressing for negotiations, we say that this is a reason for not negotiating, and we refuse to negotiate. When our adversaries try to deprive us of the pretext for refusing to negotiate, we find no reason to negotiate, and we refuse to negotiate. When we finally find ourselves across the conference table with our adversaries, we insist on not solving the problem discussed and so again refuse to negotiate. Once more we refuse to meet with them. Then again comes the pressure, and again the "not-bowing-under-duress," and the cycle never ends. It is the game of "heads we win, tails you lose."

This suggests the line our diplomats will pursue in the long overdue negotiations with the Soviets pertaining to West Berlin. The demagogic slogan against all deadlines for the beginning, duration and conclusion of diplomatic talks is being used to prevent the settlement of the Berlin issue in 1961. This being the immediate objective, our diplomats will do their "best" at least to postpone any normalization of the situation in Berlin and Germany for as long as possible. The pursuit of such ends hardly amounts to bona fide negotiations. Even when our representatives meet and talk with their diplomatic counterparts, they are involved in obstruction, not in negotiation.

In the meantime our machine in Germany is working full speed, provoking the East German regime to resort to self-protective measures in Berlin. Such measures are then depicted as manifestations of political tyranny. At a distance of thousands of miles, every

American-paid spy, saboteur, provocateur who, after fulfilling his cloak-and-dagger mission, attempts to reach a West Berlin headquarters, can be misrepresented as the innocent victim of political persecution. In sponsoring such activities, we have virtually forced the East German authorities not only to seal off the Berlin sector but also to erect walls and barbed wire fences along the frontier.

The divorcement of our propaganda from reality is evident from the fact that any negotiations with the Soviets regarding Berlin are, in the end, bound to be conducted along the lines suggested by Premier Khrushchev. His proposals never included demands for Soviet or East German expansion; and in general terms they exhaust the possible alternatives to the prevailing dangerous situation in the city. When our spokesmen now state that here and there Soviet diplomats indicate a readiness to negotiate seriously, the reference is to precisely what the Soviets have been willing to do all along. The change of heart is entirely ours. Yet our readiness to *talk* should not necessarily be taken for a readiness to *negotiate*. As long as we attempt to prolong the intolerable situation in Berlin, we are not making the world one bit safer.

However, the belated admission that the Soviets *can* be talked to, that what they are after is not a *causis belli*, constitutes in itself an important change. Obviously, President Kennedy must feel that his misrepresentation of the Berlin controversy as a war situation has sufficiently served his military-budget aspirations to discontinue the pretense. He has used

(Continued on Page 16)

## The Balance of Efficacy

The appointment of an acting Secretary-General of the United Nations will not necessarily resolve the administrative impasse that antedates the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld. More than mere personal succession is at stake. The untimely death of Dag Hammarskjöld has aggravated the problem; but it has not created it.

What is truly at stake is the effectiveness of the United Nations. This effectiveness can be crippled in two ways: one, by depriving the organization of executive efficacy which would happen with the Soviet-desired triumvirate; the other, by depriving it of broad representation in all of its functions and agencies. While the first would turn the United Nations into a mere (though still needed) debating forum, the other would in fact turn it into an instrument of some particular nation or group of nations. Either of these developments could be crucial.

While the Soviet Government has been guilty of endangering the United Nations by attempting to deprive it of executive effectiveness, the American Government has consistently limited the representative scope of the organization. If the U.N. is not to become a shameful fiasco, a delicate balance must be maintained between its executive effectiveness and its political breath of representation.

The U.N. does not exist in order to embarrass the Soviet Union or any other nation. It does not exist in order to provide an international rubber stamp for the diplomatic machinations of one government or another. It should not be used as a mechanism for one nation to impose its will upon another; but to reconcile differences and to build upon the common denominator of international goodwill.

That's why mere executive power does not suffice. If such executive power is not democratically restrained, the State Department may succeed in using the U.N. for partisan advantage; but this would bring about the deterioration of the organization.

The recent election of Dr. Arne Sigvard Eklund of Sweden as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency provides a sad case in point. That this election was made by completely disregarding the Soviet position has strengthened the Western hold upon the agency; simultaneously it has doomed it to inertia.

The American insistence on a single executive head of the United Nations is, basically, the only position compatible with an effective organization. Such effectiveness will not be achieved, however, if it does not include provisions for the broadest possible international consensus. Without the latter, the power of the single Secretary-Gen-

eral could easily become an extension of the foreign office of that nation which holds the most favored access to the Secretary-General. The developments in the Congo followed this pattern and thereby precipitated the U.N. crisis.

Whatever the specifics of the *modus vivendi*, it must be based on the concentration of the executive power in a single, nation-divorced individual—while at the same time it must accommodate broad representation on a meaningful consultative level.

To achieve this, both the Soviet Union and the United States must be ready to compromise their respective positions. Such newly-acquired fidelity toward the U.N. would oblige the United States to acquiesce in the admission of China as well as in creating new meaningful consultative positions in the Secretariat-General. In turn, the Soviets would have to give up the sabotage of their demand for a multi-national atomization of the office of the Secretary-General.

Oct. 6, 1961

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## For a Reduction of World Tensions

The following statement was unanimously agreed upon, with no abstentions, at the conclusion of the international meeting on disarmament recently held at the Hotel Russell in London. A list of the participants is given at the end.

The international meeting on disarmament and the reduction of world tensions convened in London from September 14th to 16th, 1961, brought together at this critical moment personalities from the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, India and other countries of Europe, Asia and Africa who are united in their desire for a world without nuclear weapons and war. The meeting declares:

### I

Neither the Berlin crisis, constituting an immediate danger of war, nor any other problems, can be resolved by military means. Every local war in the centre of Europe is likely to become a general atomic war.

War must be avoided. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France should immediately enter into negotiations on Berlin and the German question on a basis of the real situation and with a sincere desire to reach agreement. We put forward the following suggestions:

1. A statute recognizing the independence of West Berlin and free access to the city must be guaranteed on a clearly defined contractual basis by the four States with a U.N. guarantee and a U.N. presence.
2. Sixteen years after the end of the second world war it is now necessary to confirm the fact of the existence of the German Federal Republic and of the German Democratic Republic.
3. The frontiers of Germany (the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic) as provisionally fixed after the second world war, must be recognized as final both by these four states and by the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, and their inviolability guaranteed.
4. The re-unification of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic is a matter for decision by the two German States and should not constitute a danger to European security.
5. Any further re-armament of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic should be stopped immediately and their present armaments must be reduced.
6. No nuclear weapons must be on the territory of the two German States nor must their soldiers be instructed in the use of these weapons.
7. The creation of a zone without nuclear weapons, consisting of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, together with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and its eventual de-militarization, with effective measures of inspection and control, and the integrity of these territories, should be guaranteed by the USA, the USSR, Great Britain, France and the United Nations.

### II

The present international crisis has demonstrated all the dangers of an accelerated arms race and has increased the danger of an accidental nuclear war, which is desired by none of the atomic powers but is rendered possible by the dynamics of the nuclear war machine.

Only general and complete disarmament can save mankind from war. We accordingly call on the peoples to urge their governments to take immediate steps towards this goal of general and complete disarmament.

Disarmament negotiations have been held up in the past by the suspicions on the one side that only partial disarmament or arms control was intended, on the other that serious control of the process would not be permitted.

We accordingly call on all governments for a clear declaration that they stand for a policy of total disarmament and that they will accept appropriate controls at each stage and the gradual development of organs of world security.

We call for the rapid completion of such negotiations under the auspices of U.N.O., including the People's Republic of China, and the setting up of an international authority to supervise the rapid execution of the agreed disarmament plan.

The U.N. specialized agencies and other government and non-governmental bodies, such as the trade unions, business circles, religious groups and so on, must be urged to intensify their studies of the relation of disarmament to international and domestic economic relations.

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# An Open Letter to the Reporters of the New York Times.

Dear Fellow Newspapermen:

As one who has practiced your profession for a quarter of a century, I address myself to matters of professional ethics. I am partly prompted by the correspondence I have lately received from some of you. In it expression was given to the conflict between personal conscience and the publisher-assigned duties of dishonest reporting.

I too faced the dilemma that now is yours. I too made a choice between secure income, prestige and recognition on the one hand and the privilege of reconciling my life endeavor with my personal conscience. The Minority of One, for whose integrity some of you had so much praise (and envy), testifies as to the choice I have made.

I don't consider myself a hero, nor a martyr. What I have gained through applying honestly whatever journalistic talents I possess amounts to much more than I have lost. I don't claim to be a happy individual, for how can any concerned person be happy in these times of uncertainties and dangers? But I am not frustrated, and I delight in the knowledge that I am serving peace, justice and integrity as best I understand them.

These problems involve the life and death of our generation. To give you but one instance: one of you wrote the editorial which appeared in your newspaper on September 23rd. Since it was not signed, I don't know whether or not its author was among those who have written me. He editorialized that Khrushchev "is even an apt pupil of Hitler in the technique of the 'big lie.'" In a message to the East Germans he declares that "in reply to our peaceful proposal to conclude a peace treaty, the Western powers threaten us with war, which under present conditions will inevitably lead to a nuclear world catastrophe." Khrushchev knows this to be a lie."

I have been wondering whether you read the New York Times. Not that I would be surprised if you don't, for the effort one must make to find his way through the jungle of poor journalesque and the ocean of nauseating advertising known as the New York Times is truly exhausting. But your professional association makes it more or less obligatory to undertake the tiresome daily wrestling with the pounds of abused paper.

I wonder how you reconcile the above editorial quote with the report of one of you that "President Kennedy is understood to have had several discussions with leading aides . . . on the question of the United States' nuclear threat 'credibility.'" Jack Raymond reported this, under the headline "Symington Says U.S. Would Use Atom Weapons," the very morning after your editorialist called Khrushchev a liar because he referred to such threats.

You know, Gentlemen, that one could quote many, many more passages from your own reports, columns and editorials to prove that in making his assertion Khrushchev no more than echoed the American press. Or, to take just one other instance. On September 24th your Max Frankel reported that "It is the official United States view that East Germany exists and that there has been and can be no pretending that it does not exist." Even if we forget all other pertinent material, previously, simultaneously and subsequently published in your newspaper, and even if we claim to know nothing about our Government's non-recognition policy toward East Germany, Frankel's own headline, "Both Sides Hint Easing of Tough Berlin Policy," contradicts his report. It clearly indicates his knowledge that the recognition policy would constitute a departure from, and not a continuation of, our policy up to now.

Virtually every issue of your newspaper, Gentlemen, would require whole volumes, if one were to treat exhaustively of its contradictions or to trace all the innate evidence of your awareness that it is you, and not Mr. Khrushchev, or at least not only Mr. Khrushchev, who indulge in Goebbels' technique of the "big lie." The use of this technique on your part is so widespread, that I have found a defense-technique by which I can learn much truth from you, unbelievable as this may sound. My technique is rather simple: I don't believe you, and since I don't believe you, it is relatively easy to turn your lies inside out and come up with the truth.

Those confessional letters! I cannot help bearing in mind your sad inward rebellion while reading the product of your utter professional prostitution. Your nonchalance is truly spectacular. You are throwing sparks upon the oil that may ignite the world of which you are a part! And all this for the measly discrepancy between your present career and an honest one.

I do not wish to discourage your letters of confession, except insofar as you use them for expiation; and thereupon continue uninterruptedly the very sins of which you claim to be ashamed at heart. Stop and reflect that you will not escape the fire you are helping to ignite. Then compare the expediences that bribe you with the ultimate price which everybody, yourselves included, will have to pay. If you can achieve this sound perspective, then, even from the standpoint of pure self-interest, you should have no difficulty in refusing to trade your life for a few dollars or credit lines.

Sincerely,  
M. S. Arnoni, Editor  
The Minority of One

P. S. James Wechsler, the editor of The New York Post, has recently challenged Pravda of Moscow to print his attack on Chairman Khrushchev. Pravda did. I challenge you and your editors to reprint this letter in the New York Times. Incidentally, Mr. James Wechsler is one of the editors whose staff members wrote me confessionals. Would he too, possibly, display the fairness he demanded of and received from Pravda, and reproduce in his newspaper this open letter, including the post script?

# The Other Side of the German Refugee Problem

By Friedrich J. Jaeger

For years the American press has been presenting a distorted and one-sided picture of the refugee problem in Germany. The migratory trends of the German population, to the degree that they were directed from East to West Germany, have been misrepresented as a purely political movement. They are alleged to dramatize the prison atmosphere in East Germany versus the unadulterated freedom in West Germany.

The Berlin crisis and the increase in German migration that resulted from it provided a new opportunity for the one-sided press to depict the refugees from East Germany as the victims of the greatest political drama of our times. When the East German authorities took measures to control the crossings from East Berlin to West Berlin, the action was presented by the American press as a means of preventing the depopulation of the (East) German Democratic Republic.

## POLITICS OR ECONOMICS?

If we should follow the pattern used in misrepresenting the German refugee problem and apply it to the migratory trends within the United States, one could easily be misled into believing that we are in for an imminent repetition of the Civil War. Because then we would have to interpret the relocation of certain industries to the South not as purely economic phenomena but as acts of political rebellion. The picture would present every factory that relocates in search of tax benefits, cheap labor and other local favors, as a political headquarters involved in a political stratagem. Each trailer on an American highway could then be depicted as a concealed military unit making its choice between two political camps. This analogy will not seem far-fetched to anyone acquainted with the migration between East and West Germany.

The truth of the matter is that the administrative-political division of Germany into two separate entities cut across all those family, economic and cultural ties that are the properties of a nation. Under these conditions the mere visit of East Berliners at the home of their relatives in West Berlin offered itself for misrepresentation as a political act.

There were many other occasions for propagandistic fanfare. The most important single factor that accounts for the migratory trends between the two German states are the seasonal shifts in employment opportunities. Such migratory trends occur in each and every country, but when they take place in Germany, they are misrepresented as a political rather than an economic process.

Such misrepresentation would not be possible were it not that those who indulge in it close their eyes completely to the phenomenon of

West Germans migrating to East Germany. The truth of the matter is that simultaneously with the migration from East to West there is also migration from West to East. If we consider the populations of East Germany and West Germany, then it becomes obvious that during many periods relatively more West Germans were moving to East Germany than vice versa. Basil Davidson wrote in the DAILY HERALD of London, on March 27, 1956, that "Last year the West German Government said that about 267,000 people came to them from Eastern Germany. But the flow also runs the other way. Last year the East German Government said that about 140,000 people arrived from Western Germany." For the 17 million East Germans to attract and to absorb 140,000 refugees from the West was a greater political and economic achievement than for the 48-million highly subsidized West Germans to attract and to absorb 267,000.

The veteran German pacifist Heinz Kraschitzki, who lives in West Berlin, wrote in the LONDON PEACE NEWS of June 26, 1959: "Last August the Bonn Government suggested that there was a 'tremendous' increase in refugees from the East. But the Ministry for Refugees, Bonn, had to admit the facts. While in August, 1957, there had been 26,000, in August, 1958, there were only 21,000. Not a 'tremendous increase'! But such statistics never consider those who are going West-East. They were given (by the East Germans) to be about 6,000 per month, so that the real surplus of refugees East-West over those West-East was only 15,000. Meanwhile we have had months with no more than 10,000 migrants East-West, while the number of such West-East has remained at about 6,000 per month. This would mean that the surplus is only 4,000 — a rather insignificant number."

## WHO ARE THE REFUGEES?

Amidst heavy propaganda, here and there the truth of the situation has been admitted. As far back as January 1, 1955 the NEW YORK TIMES said in a report from Bonn: "A somewhat unexpected development, particularly in the final months of this year, has been the steady increase of the flow from West Germany to Communist East Germany. The number of those going to Communist-governed Germany has been running between 8,000 and 9,000 monthly compared with a monthly figure of about 12,000 coming west . . . The tendency is to abandon the whole idea that people now crossing the frontier between the two Germanies are refugees. The actual refugee from political persecution in Communist East Germany has now become rare. Officially 2 percent are recognized as refugees (Ours italics — TMO)." Speaking of West German residents who went to East Germany the same report said that "The West German authorities' information indicates

*What is behind the tragic story of the East German so-called refugees? Is it a human drama or is it a chapter in cold war subversion? Are they politically persecuted people, or are they paid agents, saboteurs, spies and criminals? Is East Germany a country of hungry, suffering people, or is it a prospering, industrializing society? A West German writer takes us behind the falsehoods of press headlines.*

that few of these were Communists. Most of them went to Communist Germany seeking economic opportunity . . ." In fact, the seeking of better individual opportunities accounts for most of the migration in both directions.

The economic opportunity, however, is not always spontaneous. The West German Government has been intentionally developing industries along the frontier of East Germany. It has even helped to build new towns along the frontier as an attraction to labor from across the boundary. Heavy propaganda on the part of the West German Government, which has no difficulty in reaching the East German population, has significantly stimulated the flow of "refugees" from East Germany. Many of them, lured by the glowing reports of life in West Germany were bitterly disappointed when they tried to cash in those promises. Disillusioned, they quickly returned to East Germany, where "the East German Government has accepted returning former residents without troubling more than a few of them." (N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1955).

Among the "refugees" there are also people working for the Western intelligence services, the usual drifters, people dissatisfied with their wives or jobs, criminals in flight of prosecution and other anti-social elements. Malcolm Page, who worked for several weeks in a transit camp for young East Germans in West Germany reported in the October 5, 1955 MANCHESTER GUARDIAN: "More than half the boys come from disturbed home conditions . . . many have been imprisoned for minor offenses . . . Relatives and broadcasts have told them that West Germany is wonderful, so generally they are disappointed when they find they cannot do as they like in the land of liberty . . . The refugees in the work camp were . . . unenthusiastic workers."

The West German daily OFFENBACH POST of June 16, 1959 gave this picture of the East German refugees: "Hardly a week goes by in which the Juvenile Court of Offenbach does not have to deal with young people who have come to us from the Soviet occupation zone and have here become delinquents . . . Most of them come because of a desire for adventure which makes the West seem tempting to them. They are then welcomed with open arms at the border. But they must soon live in camps or in the mass production atmosphere of the refugee homes. They then lose their footing completely."

## THE TAILORED SAGAS

Once the refugees reach West Germany, they are closely scrutinized and interrogated for their politics. It takes no time for them to learn what kind of information is pleasing to their political interrogators upon whom their future depends. They then feed the propaganda machine with those depictions of East Germany

Mr. Jaeger is a West German political writer. During World War II, he spent several years in the United States as a prisoner of war. His previous contributions to TMO appeared in the August and October, 1961 issues.



# Three Cheers

which are expected of them. The news services carry their fictions as factual material, and the American reader is never told the truth about how the "factual material" was obtained. A monthly publication of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, NEWS FROM GERMANY, complained, in November 1958, that "These interrogations through Allied intelligence services are undignified and provocative . . . They are a scandal because they exploit the misery of the refugees . . . Officials in West Berlin have no way of telling refugees before they are questioned that their answers will not influence the decision whether they will be admitted as refugees."

## THE VALLEY OF TEARS

Closely tied to the misrepresentation of the refugee problem is the misrepresentation of the prevailing situation in East Berlin and East Germany. It stands to reason that if the refugees are depicted as people who run in panic and terror from East Germany, East Germany must be presented as an intolerable place to live. The depiction of the "drabness" of East Berlin versus the booming appearance of West Berlin has become a cliché. This does not however make it true. Walter Lippmann has admitted, on April 7, 1959, that "East Berlin is primarily a working class district and the standard of life has always been notably more drab than in West Berlin, which has always had a large middle class and many rich people."

The amazing economic recovery of East Berlin and East Germany is largely ignored by the American press. As far back as the end of September 1953, an official but confidential memorandum of the West German State Bank informed the various West German authorities that "The real and nominal value of the national income in the East Zone has risen steadily since 1950. The prices of rationed foodstuffs, rent, transport and public services are approximately 10 to 15% lower than in West Germany. Persons employed in the professions are paid 50 to 100% more than in similar situations in West Germany . . . In addition a study of the tables of wages paid in industry gives the impression that they too are somewhat higher than in West Germany. Minimum pensions paid by the social security exceed similar payments in the Federal Republic by between one tenth and one fifth. Net incomes in the East Zone are between 10 and 20% higher than in West Germany."

Certainly, the economic situation in East Germany has improved since 1953. The WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 23, 1960 said that ". . . there are many signs that life for the average citizen is getting better. Massive housing programs are providing cheap apartments. The quality of clothing, shoes and appliances is rising, along with output. The real income of consumers is trending upward. Says a United Nations economic study: 'The rise in real wages in Eastern Germany in 1959 seems to have been the highest in any country for which data are yet available.' Industrial production last year rose 12.3% over 1958, compared with estimated gains of 5.7% in booming West Germany and about 3% in the U.S. And with total East German investment in industry scheduled to rise by 16% in 1960, more gains are expected."

NEWSWEEK's senior editor, Arnaud de Borchgrave, after touring East Germany, wrote on May 2, 1960: "Already, East Germany has outstripped Czechoslovakia to become the world's eighth biggest industrial nation . . . as I found in towns and villages throughout East Germany, (its 'Wirtschaftswunder') is much more impressive than most of us realize."

I suspect that to most American newspaper readers the above information would be news.

► FOR GOVERNOR J. MILLARD TAWES of Maryland for favoring state legislation to end racial segregation in restaurants.

► FOR PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY for turning down a recommendation of the Tariff Commission to raise the tariffs on imported Wilton carpets.

► FOR PAUL RAND DIXON, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, for criticizing the courts for their leniency in administering penalties for violations of antitrust laws.

► FOR U.S. CONGRESS for turning down the Justice Department's demands for legislation allowing the use of wire-tapping in cases involving "national security."

► FOR MICHAEL J. QUILL, President of the Transport Workers Union of America, for favoring the "socialization" of transportation facilities in the United States and the formation of a National Labor Party.

► FOR SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE for calling on the Administration to recognize de facto East Germany.

► FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for reversing a previous ruling and recognizing that the agency shop, which allows unions to collect fees from non-union members, is lawful.

► FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR for announcing cross-country hearings of a subcommittee headed by Rep. James Roosevelt on racial and religious job discrimination.

► FOR JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS of the U.S. Supreme Court for calling on the Government to recognize Outer Mongolia and not to block its admission to the United Nations.

► FOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, Secretary of Labor, for not participating in the conference of employment security agencies because of the racial discrimination practiced by the Atlanta hotel in which it was held.

► FOR THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION for recommending to the President and to Congress to speed up the desegregation of schools.

► FOR THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION for issuing rules designed to end race discrimination on interstate buses and in terminals.

► FOR CHARLES S. RHYNE, former President of the American Bar Association, for suggesting that the United States submit the legal issues involving Berlin to the World Court for an advisory opinion.

► FOR SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT for his determined criticism of the political activities of the U.S. armed forces.

► FOR ABRAHAM A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, —for advocating legislation to protect the consumer against worthless drugs whose marketing is presently unrestricted by law; —for candidly accusing the nation and its educators of a lack of concern for education.

## Political Commentary

I'm sad for you, America;  
I pity any suicide.  
Ostrich-like, your people hide  
From knowledge of the danger near.  
When generals say, "The time is here."  
It will be much too late to fear.  
You will be dead.  
Then overhead  
Your mushroomed ash  
will mark the zone  
Where once a nation swelled with pride.  
Poor ignorants! You won't be shown  
The lives you end will be your own.  
Communist dupel  
Shut up, shut up!  
You poor misguided, misinformed.  
There is no need to be alarmed.  
We will have peace in our time.  
I'll bet with you, America,  
Although I cannot win the bet.  
For how can I collect the debt  
When all are dead, I too?

I'll die too fast  
To laugh the last  
But just the same, 'twill be on you.  
Don't listen to that stupid fool  
Called Jeremiah. Commie tool!  
He tells us **we** would start a war!  
We who always have stood for  
Peace and freedom under God.  
(That we learned in grammar school.)  
It is too late, beloved friends;  
I asked a thousand Americans  
"Would you choose  
being Red or dead?"  
Nine hundred ninety-eight all said,  
"We will die free!"  
Behind a tree  
Two of the youngest citizens,  
A girl and boy, in tight embrace,  
Felt warmth desert each other's face.  
He tried to comfort, wept instead.  
Lovers will go without a trace.

Phillip G. Schrag

# Social Responsibility of Computer People

By Edmund C. Berkeley

From the start of the computer field in 1944 until the end of 1957, people working in the field had more or less automatically assumed that computers and data processors were a great benefit for human beings, a marvelous extension of man's intellect, one of the most exciting and beneficial developments of the 20th Century.

This was different from the feeling of social responsibility felt by the nuclear scientists, who unlocked the atomic bomb. This feeling led to the founding of the Federation of American Scientists to push for the wise use of nuclear energy, the efforts of scientists through the MacMahon Act to put nuclear energy under a civilian agency (the Atomic Energy Commission) instead of under a military agency, and the publication of the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS.

In October, 1957, the Russians launched Sputnik I, with its computer-calculated table of arrival here and there all over the earth. No one can put a satellite into orbit successfully without many applications and uses of computers.

The first ripple of recognition of the social responsibilities of computer people seems to have been a letter sent to the editors of the magazine COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION by a Mrs. P. Cammer of Huntington, L. I., N. Y. It said: "I have no interest in computers and automation except in so far as they can better

Mr. Berkeley is the editor and publisher of the COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION magazine. This article is a part of a chapter from a book, THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION, scheduled to be published in 1962.

the human lot. It is my opinion that apart from noted achievements to that end, they are on the whole more of a curse to humanity than they are a blessing. I think it is an outrage to civilization for great minds — for all minds — to work on devices for A-bombs, H-bombs, and the tribe of idiot missiles and other weapons that are the foundation of modern economics."

The letter aroused the editors of the magazine, and it was published. The magazine began asking questions: "Are computers and automation a curse or a blessing? What is the social responsibility of scientists for the scientific development they produce?" In February, the magazine said in an editorial: "One of the papers recently submitted . . . was entitled something like 'Diffusion Calculations on the . . . (trade name) Electronic Computer.' It came from a writer at the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, and referred to a 'chemical munition, which is designed to disseminate an agent in the form of gaseous or aerosol cloud which will travel near the surface of the earth.' The phrase 'poison gas' was avoided, but that is the concept which leapt into your editor's mind."

This paper reminded me of some of the problems which the Nazis put into arithmetic books for young boys to study. One problem that I remember asked a youngster to calculate how many bombs would be required to destroy a circular town, given that one bomb would destroy such and such an area, and given the diameter of the town.

I can well imagine that if automatic electronic digital computers had been available in

Nazi Germany, they would have been applied to computations such as finding out how much nerve gas would be economically necessary to kill stated numbers of Jews in the concentration camps of Buchenwald, Dachau, Maidanek.

There are weapons which can be used for defense and not for offense, like a radar-warning network. There are weapons which can be used for defense and offense both, like a fighter aircraft. And there are weapons that can be used for offense only, like poison gas and biological warfare, such as the spreading of a mortal disease that only one combatant has an antitoxin for. Incidentally, successful biological warfare is probably more efficient than any kind of atomic bombs because it selects human beings and puts them to death, leaving enemy property intact and the air and earth uncontaminated by radioactivity.

To look back in history, there are other weapons used for offense only, and especially against captives: torture, starvation, operations to change the character of virility of a prisoner, the torture of the prisoner's kin in front of him.

All these fields are open to science, to experiment and investigation. But is there no *horror-point*? Is there no point at which a self-respecting human being should say "I cannot do this — I cannot study this, investigate this, publish this, I cannot have anything to do with this, this is horrible?"

Responding to these questions, it will be a very long time, if ever, before COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION publishes articles dealing with "diffusion calculations" of the spreading of poison gas . . .

## Conclusion

The peoples and their governments can still avert a nuclear war, which would be a criminal act, menacing the further existence of mankind and life on our earth. There can be no victory for anybody in a nuclear war.

In spite of our differences of opinion on some of the questions discussed and aware of our responsibility, we undertake to do all we can to enlighten public opinion on the dangers of war and on the urgent need for disarmament. We hope that the various trends of opinion for peace will be able to co-ordinate their efforts in the defense and preservation of mankind.

## Second Resolution

We propose to convene a larger conference on the same theme, to which will be invited people drawn from intellectuals, trade unions, the Churches, Science and a wide range of political opinion.

The list of those present when the Statements were agreed is as follows:

H. SIRADJUDDIN ABBAS (Indonesia)  
BARON A. ALLARD (Belgium)  
GUNTHER ANDERS (Austria)  
GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH (Great Britain)  
PROFESSOR J. D. BERNAL (Great Britain)  
MADAME ISABELLE BLUME (Belgium)  
HEINRICH BUCHENBINDER (Switzerland)  
OLEG BYKOV (USSR)  
DR. HENRY J. CADBURY (USA)  
LORD CHORLEY (Great Britain)  
MRS. DIANA COLLINS (Great Britain)  
MAURICE COSYN (Belgium)  
MADAME EUGENIE COTTON (France)  
JOHN DARR, JR. (USA)  
THE REVEREND DICKIE (Australia)  
OSTAP DLUSKI (Poland)  
ILYA EHRENBURG (USSR)  
MRS. MARION FARINACCI (Italy)  
RABBI ABRAHAM L. FEINBERG (Canada)

ERICH FROMM (USA)  
EDOUARD LE GHAIT (Belgium)  
PROFESSOR L. C. B. GOWER (Great Britain)  
PROFESSOR L.C.B. GOWER (Great Britain)  
JACQUETTA HAWKES (Great Britain)  
PROFESSOR JOSEF HROMADKA (Czechoslovakia)  
DR. HOMER JACK (USA)  
FRANCIS JUDE (Great Britain)  
ROBERT JUNGK (Austria)  
AMINU KANO, M.P. (Nigeria)  
DR. HEINZ KLOPPENBURG (German Federal Republic)  
ALEXANDER KORNEICHUK (USSR)  
PROFESSOR D.D. KOSAMBI (India)  
DIWAN CHAMAN LALL, M.P. (India)  
PROFESSOR F. LIEB (Switzerland)  
LUCIO LUZZATTO (Italy)  
IVOR MONTAGU (Great Britain)  
EDITA MORRIS (Sweden)  
IRA MORRIS (USA)

THE REVEREND A. J. MUSTE (USA)  
JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN (India)  
S. OMUBO  
MRS. AVA PAULING (USA)  
PROFESSOR LINUS PAULING (USA)  
MRS. ORLIE PELL (USA)  
DR. ANTOINETTE PIRIE (Great Britain)  
DARRELL RANDALL (USA)  
E. A. ROBERTS (Great Britain)  
ARCHBISHOP ROBERTS (Great Britain)  
SENATOR VELIO SPANO (Italy)  
PROFESSOR IVAN SUPEK (Yugoslavia)  
BERTIL SVAHNSTROM (Sweden)  
ARPAD SZAKASITS (Hungary)  
OLIVER TAMBO (South Africa)  
PROFESSOR A. N. TUCKER (Great Britain)  
MAX WINEGAR (Switzerland)  
DR. HUGO WOLFE (USA)  
CANON L. JOHN COLLINS (Great Britain)



# Einstein: the Social Iconoclast

By Saul Gottlieb

Einstein! A part of our consciousness from childhood to this moment, particularly this moment. Then, it was Sunday-Supplement Einstein, the inscrutable genius so smart that "only 12 men in the entire world understand his Theory of Relativity" (science as mysterious as God, with as many disciples), one of the astounding "facts" you gee-whizzed into your brain along with antidisestablishmentarianism. Later, Einstein The Wandering Jew, alighting on Princeton in the dark of the '30's, emitting shy little radium-glows that cut incisively as his style, warning, reminding, warning, despairing,

*Einstein on Peace*, edited by Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden; preface by Bertrand Russell; 704 pp., Simon & Schuster, \$8.50.

warning. And with the documents giving the dramatic inside story of the birth of the Bomb finally published, he became The Bewildered Einstein pushed and pummeled by Szilard and Sachs into signing the letter to FDR. Lastly, heroically, isolatedly swam into our liberal admirations again with brave denunciations of McCarthy and the advice to the victims to refuse to testify.

This book, containing almost everything he said in letters, speeches, interviews and statements on the problem of war, civil liberties, education and academic freedom permits us to see Einstein the public man. It is of particular value to consider Einstein's political history in relation to one's own activities right now and in the immediate, if any, future. Like, do we do like Kenneth Patchen when he asks "what are we going to do?" and answers, "get ready to die;" or continue with Bertrand Russell et al to kick against the pricks; or take off for the Southern Hemisphere, as many life-hungry youngsters are doing, where the fallout may not fall?

They never told us, in those Sunday Supplements, that he was a socialist and a pacifist (nor have they told the Big Givers to the hospitals and universities who gave in his name). They are still not telling us, despite the publication of this hefty volume in 1960. It was barely promoted and scarcely reviewed. And the price ain't right.

And why should they tell us? Didn't they take from his great brain only those ideas which they could divorce from the moral and humanitarian context in which he conceived them? Did they want us to know Einstein the iconoclast, Einstein the anti-nationalist, Einstein the social critic, Einstein the war resister, Einstein the political sophisticate? Why should they want many people to know what he wrote to his friend, the Queen Mother of Belgium, in 1955: "I cannot rid myself of the thought that this, the last of my fatherlands, has invented for its own use a new kind of colonialism, one that is less conspicuous than the colonialism of old Europe. It achieves domination of other countries by investing American capital abroad, which makes those countries firmly dependent on the United States. Anyone who opposes this policy or its implications is treated as an enemy of the United States." Or why should they want many people to know what Einstein thought of the subtle psychological pressures in American life? In 1940 he wrote: "Do you believe that America's intellectual leaders would ever openly subscribe to a policy which was clearly antithetical to the feelings of the

average American? I am convinced they would not do so. Rather, they will choose, as they have done in the past, to remain passive while one bulwark of culture and justice after another is being destroyed — passive, that is, until their own turn comes. Intellectuals are cowards, even more so than most people. They have always failed miserably when called upon to fight on behalf of dangerous convictions."

Einstein was a passionate pacifist. In 1914, he courageously signed an internationalist manifesto in wartime Berlin; the last week of his life he was collaborating with Bertrand Russell on a public appeal to the heads of the big nations, "in view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind . . . to acknowledge publicly that their purposes cannot be furthered by a world war, and . . . to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them."

But Einstein was a realistic dreamer. In 1933, self-exiled, he saw clearly that Germany was "obviously pushing toward war with all available means" and he met the problem in an undocinaire manner. "So long as Germany persists in rearming and systematically indoctrinating its citizens for a war of revenge, the nations of Western Europe depend unfortunately on military defense. Indeed, I will go so far as to assert that if they are prudent, they will not wait, unarmed, to be attacked . . . They must be adequately prepared. I take little pleasure in saying this, for in my heart I loathe violence and militarism as much as ever; but I cannot shut my eyes to realities."

How the currents of our time converged in him! Perhaps he realized this, and perhaps it was his agony, the agony that seems to accompany the joy of every creative genius. When he heard the Hiroshima news, Einstein exclaimed "Oj, weh!" But as early as 1944 he was again troubled by the prospects of postwar German rearmament. "Might not the German peril, despite its having been averted for the moment, reassert itself if jealousy and strife weaken the Allies after the war? Will the impact of the great losses of this war help us avoid a repetition of the blunders and evil experiences which we suffered from 1918 to 1939? . . . It is possible to either destroy the German people or keep them suppressed; it is not possible to educate them to think and act along democratic lines in the foreseeable future."

And, in December 1945: "It is absolutely indispensable to prevent the restoration of German industrial power for many years . . . I do not favor revenge, but, rather, a policy of utmost security against the possibility of renewed aggression by the Germans; such security cannot possibly be accomplished through moral persuasion." Finally, in 1955, his last year: ". . . nothing astonishes me quite so much as the shortness of man's memory with regard to political developments. Yesterday the Nuremberg trials, today the all-out effort to rearm Germany."

Einstein truly lived his life and thought his thoughts. He was too genuine a man to be preoccupied with matters of superficial consistency. Each of his utterances was true, genuine and not a mere detail of a deliberate self-portrait. That's why he did not hesitate to recommend militancy against Hitler despite his being a pacifist; that's why there was no conflict between his advocacy of suppression of post-war Germany and his being a humanitarian; that's why he actively supported the Zionist cause, despite being an internationalist. He never sought to achieve intellectual consistency at the expense of being pertinent. Nor was his dedication to peace self-indulgent. When A. J. Muste asked him to sign an appeal to Eisenhower, he refused, saying: "Only powerful agencies can influence the course of events. I do not find it reasonable to do anything merely to satisfy one's personal urge. Reason alone has no effect, even if it speaks convincingly and with the voice of angels."

How did this Giant of Thought think of himself? It seems that he was much too preoccupied with the natural as well as the social mysteries of the world to indulge in self-definition. When world acclaim reached his awareness, his authentic modesty made him say (in a 1955 letter to his royal friend in Belgium): "I must confess that the exaggerated esteem in which my lifework is held makes me feel very ill at ease. I feel compelled to think of myself as an involuntary swindler. If one attempts to do anything about this, one succeeds only in making matters worse." At least one mistaken opinion Einstein held . . .

The editorial work of this volume, done by Einstein's friend Dr. Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden, provided a smooth narrative. The reader will feel a debt of gratitude to the editors for having made possible the publication of this great bible of modern humanitarianism.

## Cheers of the Year — 1961

Following a precedent established last year, the readers of THE MINORITY OF ONE will have an opportunity of expressing their recognition of individuals or groups who, in 1961, have rendered exemplary service to peace and/or the application of truth, sincerity and integrity to public life in America. As a token of such recognition the individuals and/or groups, voted upon by the readers, will be presented with appropriately dedicated bound volumes of TMO's 1961 issues.

The recipients of the Cheers of the Year — 1960 of The Minority of One were, by the choice of its readers: Dr. Linus Pauling and The Student Civil Liberties Union at the University of California, Berkeley (Junior Class).

Nominations for this year's token of recognition should be entered by the readers before November 10, 1961. They will be announced in our December issue. Thereupon readers will be requested to vote, before December 10, 1961, for the candidates of their choice. The recipients of the Cheers will be announced in the January, 1962 issue of TMO. The public presentations will be made with the participation of prominent peace workers.

There will be two classes of nominations and awards: the senior class, and the junior class reserved for a junior individual or group. Each reader may make two nominations for each of the two classes, briefly stating the justification of his choice.

Mail in your nominations for TMO's Cheers of the Year — 1961, now.

Mr. Gottlieb, a poet and screen writer, is a contributor to many American magazines.

# The Synonyms: Peace and Life

By Linus Pauling

Three and a half years ago a very important proposal about world peace was made by Mr. Rapacki, the Foreign Minister of Poland. Last year there was published a book by Edouard Le Ghait, former Belgian Ambassador and Chief of the Belgian Foreign Service, a book called *No Carte Blanche to Capricorn — The Folly of Nuclear Strategy*. This book contains many valuable and penetrating discussions of the world situation. It also deals with the Rapacki Plan. The Rapacki Plan was described by Dr. Albert Schweitzer as a "so reasonable" plan.

## THE RAPACKI PLAN

The Rapacki Plan was to prevent nuclear arms from ever being stationed in the 95,000 square miles of West Germany and the 212,000 square miles of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The essential demilitarization of that part of Central Europe would have contributed, or would contribute, to the solution of the German problem. Of course, Ambassador Kennan has made a closely similar proposal about demilitarization of such a region. The Belgian Government called this proposal a valuable contribution to the cause of peace.

In his book Mr. Le Ghait says: "But this 'valuable contribution' was never followed up." All the powers of Hell were set in motion to reject a proposal that could have saved Europe but that upset the plans of general staffs and loomed as a serious threat to the interests of the host of profiteers of the cold war.

"Up to a few years ago," he says, "the intellectuals in Western countries very sincerely felt that it was the USSR which must bear the major responsibility for the armament race and the state of tension throughout the world."

"The harsh rejection of the Rapacki Plan, the frightening paucity of the arguments used in this connection, dealt a terrible blow to the faith the intellectuals still had in the 'Free World' and its struggle for peace, democracy and a better future."

"Up to that time everything had been simple. Everything could be blamed on the Russians. And then the name of Rapacki was heard, and it echoed like a reproach to which there can be no answer."

The reason for rejecting the Rapacki Plan was the fear of our Government that the loss of West Germany would break up NATO — the desire of our Government to rearm West Germany. And now the German crisis is here again.

## PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

Russia has become more and more concerned about the possible rearmament of Germany with nuclear weapons. The West German soldiers are now being trained in firing rockets with dummy nuclear warheads over toward Russia. When will they have real nuclear warheads in those rockets? Russia advocates that negotiations be initiated now for a peace treaty with Germany. I believe that it is high time, after sixteen years, that serious negotiations for a peace treaty be started. I believe that it is essential for the welfare of the world that these negotiations lead to a disarmed Germany — and not to a Germany armed ultimately with nuclear weapons. I believe that

we should urge strongly that Central Europe be made into a demilitarized zone along the lines suggested by Rapacki and by Ambassador Kennan.

In the last ten or twelve years the nations in their rather spasmodic discussions of disarmament have finally got around to the point where all of them have stated that general and complete disarmament is the goal toward which we must work. The time has come now when we must rid the world of the immorality of war.

## ULTIMATE IMMORALITY

Ever since the dawn of civilization, war has been a prime cause of human suffering. Century after century men have killed each other in battle. They have killed each other by bashing each other's heads in with clubs and stabbing one another with spears, shooting one another with arrows, and then with crossbows, with muskets, with rifles, then by sinking one another's battleships with great guns. Long ago, in the days of barbarism, a conquering army would wipe out a village or town or city, killing not only the resisting soldiers, but the old men and the women and the children. Attila's Huns symbolized the barbarism and immorality of war.

Then, the nature of war changed. The chivalric armies attacked one another with just as great ferocity as ever, but it came to be considered immoral for the conquering army to kill the women and children in the defeated country. We have now passed through this stage of partial morality and have returned to barbarism and complete lack of morality and ethical principles on the part of nations.

During the Second World War, many villages, towns, and cities were wiped out by dropping bombs on them, setting fire to them, killing of the women and children. Patriotism and nationalism have again become synonymous with barbarism, requiring the sacrifice of babies and mothers, old men, and children.

Sixteen years ago there came the ultimate immorality — the sacrifice of the people of an entire city. As atomic bombs go, the one that smashed Hiroshima flat, killing almost all of its people, was a small bomb. The big bombs now are a thousand times as great. One of them, such as we exploded in 1954, the 1st of March, and such as the U.S.S.R. also has exploded, has the explosive energy of 20 million tons of TNT, seven times that of all the bombs dropped on Germany and Japan during the Second World War.

How many of these bombs do we have? One of them can destroy any city in the world. We have 2,000 airplanes in SAC. Each of them can carry two 20-megaton bombs. That would be a total of 4,000 20-megaton bombs, or 80,000 megatons of high explosives that could be carried by these planes. Six thousand megatons would kill practically everybody in the U.S.S.R.

The official figure often quoted as an estimate of victims of a nuclear attack upon the United States is 50 million. Such an attack would involve the dropping of 1,440 megatons, not 80,000 megatons. Eighty thousand is about fifty times that much. Who is there who believes that Russia does not have the same stockpile of nuclear weapons and the same

capacity for delivering the bombs that the United States has?

## CAN WAR SAVE BERLIN?

On the 25th of July, President Kennedy addressed the American people about the decisions that he and his Administration had taken in response to the speeches and threats which Soviet Premier Khrushchev and his agents had launched. President Kennedy said: "In Berlin, as you recall, he, Khrushchev, intends to bring an end through a stroke of his pen first to our legal rights to be in West Berlin, and secondly to our ability to make good our commitment to the two million free people of that city. That we cannot permit. We are there in West Berlin as a result of our victory over Nazi Germany. West Berlin is more than a showcase of liberty, an isle of freedom in a Communist sea. West Berlin is all that. But above all, it has now become the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation. I hear it said that West Berlin is militarily untenable. So was Bastogne. So was Stalingrad. Any dangerous spot is tenable if brave men will make it so."

What meaning does this have? President Kennedy cites the examples of the defense of Bastogne and Stalingrad. Doesn't President Kennedy know that the bombs have become a million times more powerful than they were when Bastogne and Stalingrad were defended? Does he not know that Berlin could be completely destroyed by a single bomb? If the war for which he advocates increased preparation were to be fought, there is little doubt that Berlin would be completely destroyed, along with hundreds of other cities in the world.

I can only describe this part of President Kennedy's speech as meaningless, senseless, an appeal to the emotions of the unthinking ones among the American people. The nature of war has now changed in such a way that even the concept of brave men has lost its meaning in connection with war. Will those few people who survive the nuclear war call the men, the women, the infants who are atomized and incinerated in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Moscow, Stalingrad, Berlin, London, Paris, brave men, brave women, brave infants? No. They will be mere sacrifices to the insanity that now grips the world.

## PEACE — AN ACT OF VOLITION

Sixteen years after the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have to decide whether we are going to continue along the path of militarism, of increasing our military budget, of increasing the stockpiles of great bombs, of increasing the size of the military forces, of increasing the effectiveness of the methods of delivering the bombs — all making more efficient the process of wiping the human race off the face of the earth and bringing civilization to an end. Or, are we going to revolt against militarism, to join together all of the people of the United States with all of the people of the rest of the world in a revolt against war, in a fight for peace and reason in the world, in the fight for the preservation of the human race, for the preservation of civilization, the fight for morality and ethical principles, for the happiness of human beings, the minimization of human suffering? If we do join together as war resisters in the firm determination to achieve peace and good sense, we will succeed.

These are excerpts from a talk recently delivered by Dr. Linus Pauling, Nobel Laureate, at the First Unitarian Church in Los Angeles, Calif.

A highly enlightening article, "The Truth About Fallout Shelters," by Dr. Pauling will be included in the December, 1961 issue of TMO.



# If War Comes

*The article which follows involves so many areas of knowledge in which the author is anything but expert, and it deals with issues of such paramount importance, that it is presented here in all due humility. These considerations have caused us to solicit views that place emphases different from our own, and which are expressed in the article "Can War Still Be Controlled?" (p. 12) by Dr. Robert Berryman and Mr. Sheridan D. Speeth.*

If World War III comes about — we have been told by scientists and politicians alike — it will be the last chapter in the history of the human species. Mankind would wipe itself out. In the face of the available data it is indisputable that men have gained the scientific knowledge and technological capacity to do just that. Yet, I do not share the opinion that World War III would necessarily totally obliterate the human species. Nor do I believe that a future war would necessarily totally obliterate any of the major nations (except Germany). My "optimism" is not based on technological but on political considerations.

## THE LIMITS OF HOSTILITY

Wars are launched and fought for concrete reasons and purposes, although these may often be obscured from the public. Wars usually do not erupt from an uncompromising hostility between nation-adversaries. Such hostility is usually a stimulated psychological preliminary to, or by-product of, war. The governments themselves, however, rarely share the emotional, uncompromising animosity they encourage among the populace. They keep quite rational and are capable of amazingly swift changes of mood. On May 7, 1945 the United States was still an uncompromising enemy of Germany; but a German signature on the dotted line on the following day sufficed to create the beginnings of a new international "friendship."

This restraint of international hostility and this volatility make one aware that governments do not usually launch wars for the sake of wiping out the enemy. A dead enemy is a useless enemy. The purpose of belligerence is to destroy the enemy's capacity to resist. All other assets of the enemy are intended to be preserved and effectively controlled. In a war launched to gain another nation's coal mines, for instance, nothing would be done to cripple those mines. If a war is launched to gain additional markets, nothing would be undertaken to wipe them out. A conquered nation of corpses cannot provide customers.

## WEAPONS OF CONTINGENCY

The overall extent of destruction in a future war may be determined by political objectives rather than by mere arms technology. Whether one nation or another would be totally destroyed may depend not on destructive power but on whether overall interests of the conqueror would be served in such a macabre way. Military technology will not determine the overall war objectives; rather will war objectives determine the extent of application of military technology.

When political leaders presently indulge in exchanges of nuclear threats they do so as exercises in diplomacy. They themselves do not know definitely and precisely whether, or to what degree, nuclear bombs would be resorted to in World War III. Like most new weapons

not yet tried under conditions of actual combat, nuclear weapons largely remain weapons of contingency. Not until the Spanish Civil War was it authoritatively assessed what role air forces could play in international combat. Yet the building of air forces preceded the Spanish Civil War. Until that point they were built as weapons of contingency. The same goes at present for nuclear bombs. No one has experience as to their overall effect upon an adversary's war potential and the extent of retaliation. They are therefore amassed as tanks were before anybody knew how much or how little tanks could achieve. I don't believe that there is a single military expert or general who knows with finality how and to what extent nuclear bombings will be exchanged in a future war. Yet the same experts and generals want to be sure of the availability of nuclear bombs under the conditions in which their employment might prove practical.

Indiscriminate use of nuclear bombs is less certain than often assumed, not because of moral scruples, but because war objectives would not be served in this way. In speculating on the extent of nuclear bombings, it may therefore be more important to consider the war objectives of the belligerents than their military capacity.

## AMERICAN WAR OBJECTIVES

What objectives will the United States pursue if and when it finds itself at war with the Soviet Union and her allies? Certainly, a mere ideological change of the regime in Russia and China would amount to no tangible or practical achievement. The fact that Mossadegh of Iran was not a Communist did not incline the American Government to a friendly attitude toward the nationalization of Iranian oil. Nor did the agrarian reform in Cuba prove palatable to affected American interests just because it was executed by a non-Communist regime. Accordingly, the Communist regime in Russia and elsewhere disturbs us primarily to the degree to which it prevents our economic penetration of those countries. It is such penetration the United States would attempt to achieve in case of war.

For the entire first half of this century, the United States adhered to the "Open-Door Policy" in China; and yet did not take full advantage of that policy. To a large degree this policy was used to preserve the market potential of China for future American interests. Precisely at the moment when, as a result of World War II, the United States was the only over-producing industrial power, and when the end of the war necessitated alternative outlets for its industrial potential, China's doors were slammed in the face of the American banker and merchant. Half a century's diplomatic efforts were defeated with the victory of the Chinese Revolution, and this at the very moment when the American economy was for the first time dependent upon the suddenly lost Chinese reservoir.

Whatever the sporadic conflicts on the international scene, the dependence of the American economy on armaments and therefore on international friction is directly related to and caused by the loss of China and the Open-Door Policy to the Revolution. In a future war, America will attempt first and foremost to throw the Chinese doors open once again. It will attempt to do the same in Russia and East Europe. Its objective would be to destroy the Russian, East European and Chinese industries, so as to turn those nations into customer-nations after the war.

To achieve this objective, the American strategists will be vitally interested in the survival of masses of potential customers. Dead, they would only defeat the American commercial interest. It may therefore be assumed that there would be a reluctance to use nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to the extent of endangering the survival of great masses of the enemy people. They may well be used to destroy industrial centers and defense establishments, but not on a genocidal scale.

## SOVIET WAR OBJECTIVES

The Soviet war objective would naturally be to defend the economic independence of Russia and her allies and to destroy those interests which challenge, or might challenge, that independence. From the Soviet point of view, the war objective would be achieved as soon as the American economy was deprived of its expansionist compulsion. A victory over the American armed forces alone would suffice to achieve this, since the terms of surrender would provide for the elimination of expansionist economic interests in America. The total destruction of the American people as such could not serve Soviet interests any more than obliterating the Russian people would serve American interests. On the other hand, attempts at genocide would invite retaliation in kind, something the Soviets would be vitally interested in preventing.

Germany, however, may well be an exception. Posing an unrelenting historic threat to Russia, Germany would be the only country the Soviets might be tempted to obliterate totally in case of war. Whether the Soviets won or lost the war, their power suffices to commit German genocide. In view of this, Adenauer may well prove to be the most treacherous politician any nation has ever produced. His militarization of West Germany and his attempts to prevent an East-West diplomatic accommodation are acts for which no nation will have to pay as dearly as the Germans themselves. In the perspective of one decade he may appear to many Germans as a great leader, but when the ultimate consequences of his policies eventuate, he will be recognized as the final enemy of the German people. He is so shortsighted as to be enthusiastic about developments that might spell final

doom upon his own nation. If I were a German, there is no doubt in my mind that I would prefer to see Adenauer or any faithful successor of his assassinated rather than that their policies, affecting my people, continue.

### A WAR CONVENTION

While war objectives are determined before war starts, once it is in progress purely military, and at times contradictory, considerations may take over. Although it may be of interest to a belligerent to preserve a certain industry of the enemy, that industry is not going to be spared if in the meantime it contributes significantly to the enemy's war potential. Indeed, each enemy soldier is a potential consumer and customer, but this will not save him. It may therefore be argued that once nuclear bombs are traded, things may get out of control and a war of limited objectives turn into war of total annihilation. This argument, however, does not stand up to military logic.

In one respect at least nuclear weapons have not revolutionized warfare: no war can be won by strategic means alone. Even the greatest nuclear devastation would not be the final act of war. However great its impact, you cannot impose your will upon the enemy unless you are in physical control of him. To achieve this, tactical and occupational activities must follow the strategic blows. Nuclear bombs cannot do this. They can destroy a city, but they cannot take it over and hold it as a ward for the enforcement of the victor's policy. They can weaken and demoralize the enemy, but they cannot control survivors. The tactical and occupational activities therefore will have to be conducted largely by conventional means. It stands to reason that if the military envisaged a future war as confined to nuclear bomb exchanges, no other weapons would be produced. In fact, however, the production of nuclear bombs is accompanied by an ever greater diversification of weaponry. This is done on the precise assumption that no war can be purely an atomic war.

Strategic operations are often restricted by tactical and occupational considerations. You must not put a city in flames if your immediate objective is to occupy it with your own troops. Nor can you expose it to a lethal dose of radiation if your soldiers are to enter it immediately.

The interplay of strategic, tactical and occupational operations will be as valid in any future war as in past wars. With all its revolutionary significance, the nuclear bomb has not rendered the rifle obsolete. And a future war cannot be won without rifles any more than it can be won without up-to-date strategic weapons. Neither can do the job alone.

### A NUCLEAR BLITZKRIEG?

Nuclear bombs can be exchanged quickly, and if they alone sufficed to bring about surrender, the next war would indeed be a brief one. To achieve military objectives that can be obtained by rifles only takes much longer. An industrial complex can be destroyed with relative speed. But one cannot move occupation forces across enemy territory to that weakened industrial complex with comparable speed. When we therefore consider the strategic-tactical-occupational complexity of warfare, it is not probable that the next war will be a global *Blitzkrieg*.

At the beginning of World War II, no one envisaged that it would last longer than did World War I. This seemed utterly impossible, considering the developments in military technology. When weapons of greater and faster

mass destructive power were introduced, it seemed logical that war would be briefer than when it was fought with slower and more primitive weapons.

In the September 1939 encounter between the German and Polish armies, this logic had apparently been borne out. The German-Polish war reached the decisive stage within days. This instance however is quite misleading as an indication of the effect of military technology upon the duration of war, because only one of the belligerents had the full benefit of the post-World War I technological development. The encounter was between a modern World War II force and one whose technology remained stagnant at the level of World War I. The Polish army in 1939 was something of a relic rather than a rival to the Germans. When only one of the belligerents gains technological advantage, it inevitably takes less time to subdue his enemy.

However, when two forces confront each other and both are equipped with modern technological means, the encounter may well last as long as, or even longer than, it would last if both had at their disposal more primitive weapons. A duel between two snipers may be briefer than a duel between two machine guns. The destructive potential of the machine gun is faster; but so is that of the enemy's machine gun. To neutralize either may take longer than to neutralize a rifle. The Russian tanks in World War II would have quickened the victory over Germany were it not that the Germans too had tanks; and in order to defeat them, the Red Army had to spend much time in putting the German tanks out of commission. In effect therefore the introduction of heavy tanks may have prolonged the war. The same goes for any other modern weapon, and very specifically for air forces and warships. The more sophisticated they are and the greater their quantity the more difficult and prolonged becomes the process of destroying them.

In World War III each of the belligerents will have amassed more and more sophisticated weapons. No matter how severe the strategic (atomic and other) blows will be, war has little chance of ending before the arsenal of at least one side is pretty close to being empty. The greater the arsenal that must be destroyed before hostilities end, the longer must the destructive process last.

The horrendous capacity of each nuclear submarine and each launching pad of inter-continental missiles may postpone an armistice for as long as each belligerent camp has even one such weapon.

Even the actual use of all available nuclear bombs in a future war would not necessarily be an indiscriminate use. Rather it may take much longer to use up the nuclear arsenal in strategic bombings. The resort to massive strategic nuclear bombings may indeed cause unlimited effects. It may result in the obliteration of whole nations. Since this would be a result in direct opposition to the war objectives of each of the belligerents, the only way to avert it would be to use up the huge destructive force over a longer period of time, allowing for a lesser cumulative overall effect of lethal radiation. This may well make World War III one of the longest wars ever fought.

### ACCIDENTAL WAR

While it is well possible that at certain stages, and especially if there should be a breakdown in communications, hostilities would be accidental rather than within the overall scheme of war objectives, I do not believe that such mixups would necessarily alter the

decisive nature of a future war. There may easily be some nuclear bombings that were not intended in the overall strategic plan, but they might be differentiated from the blue-printed hostilities the way we differentiate between accidental traffic fatalities and the victims of premeditated murder.

This analogy is certainly out of all proportion, because accidental nuclear bombings may kill many millions of people. Yet, one would underestimate the inherent cynicism in the conduct of war were he to believe that the number of victims a national leadership is ready to sacrifice for victory is necessarily small. If Russia retained her sovereignty during World War II by sacrificing 15 per cent of her population, what percentage of victims would seem too high for her leaders in World War III? The projective part of this question applies, of course, to the United States and other nations as well. Would national leaderships be willing to pursue their objectives "only" if they were obtainable at 25, 30, 50 or more per cent of their respective populations? What would be the limit? Or, would that limit be so stretchable that any number of victims would be considered tolerable as long as among the prospective survivors there would be people to be exploited?

If the elements who would unleash a war should envisage that at its end the "victorious" American nation would be reduced to no more than somewhere between 25-50 million people and the Communist opponent reduced from the present 1-billion to 200 million or so, would they necessarily take such an outcome as not worth the trouble? Or would they accept even such macabre results as a sufficiently rewarding prospect of post-war exploitation? Who can vouch that the conscience of war profiteers becomes a decisive factor past a certain point of human suffering? At which point would human blood gain consideration over merchandise? Or, are we once more to fall victims of the childish, if perpetual, legend that "this time" not interests but ideologies will be fought for?

*All this is not to say that if a nuclear war breaks out, its damage will necessarily remain within the limits of deliberate human control. On the contrary, I am acutely aware that this may not be the case, that once started, war may pick up its own uncontrollable momentum and end the human venture. The true problem is that those elements who may be inclined to see war as another business expedient, may believe themselves to be able to control the overall scope of destruction. In such a belief they may initiate war only to be proved wrong when the decision could no longer be reversed. The basic purpose of this presentation is therefore to point to the need of opposing World War III irrelevant of whether or not it would wipe out all of humanity. If we so convince people, the numerous Herman Kahns in our midst would no longer have a chance of "selling" them on the "idea" of a particular type or scope of World War III which, they assure us, some of us may survive. The dehumanization of the cold war has been so thorough, that the decimation of nations, as against their total annihilation, has become quite acceptable to our minds. This insanity must be counteracted. The "only" of hundreds of millions when discussing war victims, must once more be eliminated and the proportion regained in which such an "only" has no room in our minds. If we should oppose World War III only because it may annihilate all humanity, we are in effect preparing the grounds, whether for bona fide but irresponsible scientists or for political demagogues, to make a however-less-total war acceptable to us.*



## "OPTIMISTIC" NOTORIETY

In the insane semantics of the cold war, the contention that war is still possible in the nuclear era and this without wiping out humanity, is bound to be classified as an "optimistic" view. In our own evaluation, the conception of a nuclear war as "feasible" (and also the speculation that it would be a prolonged one), is the more pessimistic of the two contradictory assumptions.

The myth of the impossibility of war is not a new one. It has well preceded the nuclear age. It marked the optimism of the pre-World War I days.

I remember this myth as it prevailed in Europe immediately before World War II. The international tension was at a culminating point. Simultaneously with feverish war preparations of the various governments, the legend was being propagated that, irrelevant of the diplomatic crises, war would not break out. With all the developments in military technology war was alleged to have been rendered impossible. With the availability of lethal gases and air forces an encounter would no longer be just a frontal one; it would involve the total populations of the belligerents. It would amount to a suicidal act of the one who started it. To be sure, this line was not propagated consistently. It accompanied simultaneous talk about being "tough" with Hitler, and being "tough" connoted resisting him physically.

At present this theory is once more being propagated. And at this time also there is a lack of consistency. For simultaneously, the same leaders who assure us of the impossibility of war are feverishly preparing for it.

The repetitiousness of this pattern and its inherent inconsistency lead one to suspect that it follows a psychological method intended to secure freedom of decision for the national leaders. If their war preparations were candidly presented as preliminaries of an actual conflagration, who knows whether the people would not become scared enough to act effectively for its prevention? If however they can be misled to believe that war is impossible, they can, peculiarly, misconceive of war preparations as war prevention.

Theoretically, the contention that war is impossible may have been wrong in the days prior to World Wars I and II, yet may have gained merit in the nuclear age. That man has actually learned how to destroy all life on earth is a fact, unless we are to challenge authoritative estimates of the most prominent and reliable scientists. Political objectives however may control the application of military means to such a degree as to perpetuate the institution of war. Certainly, only the most unthinking individual could contend that our national leadership pursues policies on the assumption that war is out of the question.

Politically, the contention that nuclear war would necessarily wipe out humanity is dangerously optimistic. This is so because it invariably leads to the false conclusion that no one would consciously depart on a course that leads to the end of all life on this planet. Such a conclusion can suffice to give governments enough power and freedom of decision actually to involve us in war and this on the theory that we need not check their power to wage war because waging war is impossible.

Many well-intentioned people believe that they are fostering anti-war sentiments by describing as unavoidable the extreme effects of a nuclear conflagration. They hope in this way to counteract public apathy and indifference.

ence. They equate everything scientifically possible with everything that must happen in a future war. What such well-intentioned people fail to appreciate is that by depicting a future war as unavoidable humanicide, they may be helping to spread the feeling that there is no need to curtail such powers of government as cannot be exercised anyway.

## THE PESSIMISTIC VIEW

I find no solace in the thought that World War III would not end the experience of the human species. On the contrary, of the two possible consequences — the wiping out of all humanity and the survival of a part of it — I believe the latter to be the more tragic one. Only those who live on a continent that was not victimized by modern warfare can retain the ability to assess the horrors of World War II as against a still greater orgy of blood-letting. Such ability on the part of a man who has experienced the horrors of World War II is limited. I am sufficiently politically minded not to equate the death of one man with the death of two men. But there is an emotional as well as an intellectual limit to such sensitivity. I must admit to not possessing such sensitivity when the comparative figures go into hundreds of millions. If hundreds of millions of people are to be killed in a future war, and other hundreds of millions are to survive, there is no question in my mind but that the fate of the dead would be the "better" and "milder" one.

We must oppose war in the nuclear age not so much because we might be killed in its course as because we may be unfortunate enough to survive all the stages of its horror and then have to live on in an environment which would make death seem like salvation. I don't think that all people on earth would be killed in the next war, but there can be no question but that all the people on earth would be the victims of the next war, especially those who would not be killed.

The average American has no concept of what a country is like when it is involved in modern warfare. He still identifies the experience with mere bullet exchanges between two camps of soldiers. He has no conception of what life is like when public authority collapses, when the whim of hoodlums replaces the rule of law. Little does he appreciate that primitive cannibalism is but an innocent practice when compared with the cannibalistic demoralization of a war-afflicted citizenry.

If death be preferable over survival in modern war, one can console himself with the thought that he always retains an option. If things get truly intolerable, he can commit suicide and thereby immediately trade intolerable life for the relief of death. This too is the projection of the inexperienced mind. Under the impact of war experiences, our minds will not be the same as they are. We will then not be able to act upon our present values. Rather we will cling to life no matter what. In the general war perversion of the mind, we will act out of purely animalistic instincts. Under normal conditions, it may well seem to us that we would much rather die than commit certain atrocious acts. Once in an atrocious environment, this mentality may no longer be ours. Motivated by nothing but an animal-like desire to continue living, a compulsion from which we will be utterly incapable of freeing ourselves, there is no moral bottom to which we could not sink in a general anarchy. Is such survival a consolation? If we are to survive, we may well envy the dead, yet have our souls so perverted as to lack the integrity to voluntarily share their fate.

## THE INDIRECT AFFLICTIONS

The indirect afflictions of a modern war may well be as morbid as, and even more morbid than, the direct ones. The situations that may arise are too morbid to be projected by the imagination. I envisage a total collapse of public authority. This tragedy would be greater in America than in any previously war-afflicted country.

The entire present power structure in America is unthinkable without elaborate and effective application of mass psychology. The American system could not endure for a single day were it not for the citizenry's compliance achieved through subtle psychological checks. The psychological arm that controls American society would be the first one to collapse under the impact of heavy enemy blows. There would be no way for the American people not to awaken to the stark realities against which they have been keeping their eyes closed in times of peace. All present superficial patriotic professions would suddenly be put up to a bold test in a reality in which the individual would be much more concerned with survival than with conforming. The authorities would be too busy attempting to save themselves to attend to civilian matters with anything approaching efficacy. Who, for instance, can envisage the consequences of the disruption of public transportation alone? It would cut off supplies and paralyze law enforcing agencies. A man's survival would no longer depend on his job. How then would he secure his food? I can see gangs of toughs roaming in each city, community, street and village. They would impose their own laws, killing, plundering and doing as they pleased. There would be no place man could call his own; he would only know where he was for the moment, but as soon as he left that place he could never be certain that he would return to it again, or that it would still be the same if he returned.

I also envisage a series of civil wars in a war-torn America. All the fundamental social antagonisms, whose mere existence is being denied by our system, could no longer be shoved under the rug as "un-American." They would lead to a perpetual power struggle in a situation in which the civilian authority would be so weak, demoralized and ineffective that even small groups of challengers could throw it off. We would hardly even know what was going on in America, each community having become isolated from others by a collapse of communication and transportation.

One thing is quite certain to me. Even if the United States of America were to win the next world war, the victory could not possibly be cashed in upon by those elements who now believe themselves to have a vested interest in it. Social stresses in American life, ideologically and propagandistically disguised in time of peace, cannot remain effectively camouflaged under a war-weakened regime. Human suffering would then be so great, that the populace, no longer bribed by a real or imaginary prosperity, would turn in wrath against its economic oppressors. People may be quite calloused to abuses committed against them as long as they have something to lose in a rebellion. This would not apply in times of acute and general suffering. The survivor of a family, hungry, deprived and desperate, with no ties to cling to, with no economic assets to be concerned with, would not be indifferent or passive about the self-enrichment of the social scavengers.

My advice to hopeful war profiteers, even on a level of sheer expediency, would be to put the breaks on this catastrophic war trend which will not bear out its promise of profits for them.

# Is Controlled War Still Possible?

By Robert Berryman and Sheridan Dauster Speeth

Deliberate use of war as an "extension" of national diplomacy presupposes that military action has a predictable (and considerable) chance of achieving important economic objectives. Predictability of outcome is the crucial aspect, for if the direct and indirect consequences of the war cannot be foretold with some confidence, no rational evaluation of their significance for a nation's economy is possible. Can such predictions be made when nuclear weapons are to be employed? We will first argue that such is clearly *not* the case in the event of *all-out* nuclear war, and then we shall examine critically the view that it is possible when the use of nuclear arms is "controlled."

## ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR

Could either side expect economic advantages from an all-out nuclear war? A look at the destructive capacities of the U.S. and the USSR will give the answer. On the basis of highly conservative contemporary estimates (given by A. T. Hadley both in *ARMY* magazine and in his book *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control*. New York: Viking, 1961) the first strike capability of the U.S. is at least 18 to 20 kilomegaton (the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 tons of TNT). The Soviets possess at least half this amount. For the present world population the total is far more than enough to provide 10 tons of explosive for each and every human being. An American first strike would be sufficient to cause 85 to 90% of the Soviet people to become casualties within the first 60 days. In spite of such incredible destruction, the USSR would nevertheless be able to mount a second strike of about 5 kilomegatons. Because of greater urbanization, and certain local peculiarities of weather and terrain, this smaller amount of weapons would still kill 140,000,000 Americans (75 to 80% of the population) within the first 60 days.

How likely is it that an attack on the U.S. would be of such massive proportions? Defense Secretary McNamara was asked to tell the Hollifield Committee how estimates of enemy attack should influence the design of civil defense programs. He replied "I believe the largest is the most likely," and recommended that civil defense officials "base their local planning on this assumption." President Kennedy is reported to have told congressional leaders that a new war would result in the death of 70,000,000 Americans (*SATURDAY EVENING POST*, Sept. 16, 1961), but many consider this to be a conservative estimate.

The numbers of victims of contemporary weapons are so large that there is no conceptual frame of reference for thinking about them. Herman Kahn has pointed out that a person standing at the window of a house as far as 20 miles from a 20-megaton explosion in the heart of Los Angeles would be immediately scorched to death. The Johnson Island experiment, carried out by the U.S. in 1958, revealed that even 300 miles away one would be permanently blinded by the light of a megaton scale explosion before having the .015 seconds needed to blink one's eyes shut. The USSR has

the ability to lift and deliver bombs having yields of as much as 50 megatons, and even 100 megatons, as threatened by Khrushchev. A mere dozen of these weapons, exploded on a clear day at high altitude, would ignite every exposed piece of inflammable material in the continental U.S. and Canada. If used only at low altitudes on military installations and "prime" targets, there would still be at least as many dead as the President indicated. The likelihood that you would be killed in the blast or shortly thereafter is estimated by President Kennedy to be the same as the likelihood that a flipped coin will come up tails. Mr. McNamara guesses that the likelihood you will live is the same as that two flipped coins will both come up heads.

In the aftermath of an all-out war on this scale, the disruption of transportation, the radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and shelter, the collapse of medical facilities and the ensuing epidemics and plagues, would all make the maintenance of civil control difficult or impossible. This is to say nothing of future effects due to the long radioactive half-life of the heavy metals in the subsequent fallout.

Nothing that carries scientific conviction can be said about the social structures that would prevail. Totally beyond scrutiny are the survivors' international economic goals, if indeed they could have any. Nor can we say anything with confidence about the social and economic aspirations of possible future human societies that might reconstitute themselves from the ashes. Some believe that complex civilization may never be known again. The geochemist Harrison Brown (*The Challenge of Man's Future*) argues that with increasing exhaustion of the earth's resources, needed materials become more and more inaccessible, and must be secured through technological processes of ever greater complexity. We are already so dependent upon a complex technology that were the equipment and capital goods on which it is based destroyed, civilization as we know it could not be rebuilt.

In short, a clear analysis cannot be made of the international situation following an all-out nuclear attack. Apart from the horrible destruction of men and goods, the absolute ambiguity of the economic consequences of all-out war obviates its use as an instrument of "rational" planning. Is this also true of "controlled" war? Is there any restricted or controlled way in which nuclear weapons can be used to obvious national advantage?

By "controlled" nuclear war we mean essentially a war in which only some small fraction of a nation's stockpile might be used, or one in which nuclear weapons are used at a slow rate extending over years.

## DESTRUCTION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Could we expect that a nuclear attack might be limited to military targets alone? Here the question of "hard" and "soft" targets applies. Planes, such as those of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), and certain surface-based missiles (such as Atlas and Thor) cannot withstand increases in pressure greater than 3 psi (pounds per square inch) above atmospheric pressure. Furthermore, the man and equipment needed to launch the ICBM arsenal would not survive the effects of nearby explosions. A 10-megaton warhead, exploded above ground, can annihilate

such "soft" targets by producing this overpressure throughout a circular area with a 12 mile radius. A 10-megaton bomb is no longer considered excessively explosive, nor too large for tactical application, nor too heavy to be carried by operational delivery systems. (Such a bomb, buried under Mount Everest, could be expected to put a significant portion of the mountain into orbit.)

In view of the susceptibility of the "soft" targets, military strategy dictates that they must be dispersed to as many different points as possible to increase the chances that a fair number of them would be useable after an attack. The present plan is to disperse many of the SAC bombers to civilian airfields. Thus, the distinction between civilian and military targets disappears.

The same is true of the "hard" targets. These missiles (such as Minuteman) are sunk deep in reinforced concrete silos which protect them from overpressures up to 100 psi. In order to eliminate such targets, warheads must be exploded on, or near the surface. This results in a far higher amount of radioactive debris in the atmosphere with accompanying increases in fallout. Furthermore, the geographic distribution of hardened bases in the U.S. strongly suggests the possibility that an assault directed at military targets alone might kill more civilians than a war aimed at lowering morale by attacking the civilian population directly. A map published in *AIR FORCE* magazine (p. 217, Sept., 1961) shows that there are active bases located in every state of the Union, including Hawaii and Alaska. They are packed on the map with a density which is very closely correlated with population density. In such a case, a decision to bomb military targets would result in an attack which would also be proportional to the number of civilians living in a given area.

## UNILATERAL DESTRUCTION

What if one side were to achieve total destruction of the other, while remaining substantially unharmed? Even though it might not be possible to put the labor and goods of the vanquished country to any economic use, the remainder of world markets would be open to the victor. Suppose, for example, that the USSR could totally destroy the U.S.

This outcome is totally unlikely, however, because of the magnitude of the second strike the U.S. could mount. With the "spy-in-the-sky" detection systems, such as Tyros and Samos, rockets can be detected at the moment they are fired from their pads. This would give the U.S. twenty-seven minutes (less decoding time) in which to launch a counter-attack. Even if there were no warning (which the USSR could achieve by sending its missiles over the South pole) and most grounded SAC bombers and other soft targets were destroyed, the hardpacked weapons and the one-third of SAC that is continuously aloft would be enough to provide great retaliatory power. The consequences in this situation, then, are the same as those of an all-out war.

One technique of controlled war that has been discussed is the systematic exchange of cities. The U.S., for example, would level Kiev; the USSR would reply by eliminating Pittsburgh. Both sides would presumably then pause to consider the next move. Another pair of cities would then be exchanged, and so on, until one side "flinched".

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# THE WAY WE SEE IT

## IN MEMORIAM: DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

Whatever Dag Hammarskjöld's mistakes, the diplomatic arena does not abound in people of his character, integrity and goodwill. There is mystery in his tragic death, and there is a sad irony in the fact that at least indirectly he fell victim to the same forces that murdered Patrice Lumumba. Hammarskjöld at one time protected the very forces which were eventually to kill not only Lumumba but himself. This does not diminish the depth of the tragedy nor the great loss humanity has suffered in the departure of Dag Hammarskjöld.

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## COCA-COLONIZATION OF WEST GERMANY

West Germany has become the most thoroughly coca-colonized country in the post-World War II era. American influence has decisively determined the politics of the country, its economics, culture and mentality. It is in this light that one should view the outcome of the recent elections in West Germany. The election campaign was conducted with the typical shallowness of such events in America. The choices offered the electorate were confined to the superficial level of verbiage, deprived of all political substance. Indeed the contest between Herr Adenauer and Herr Brandt was virtually a photostatic copy of the presidential contest

between Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Nixon. In both cases no choice of national alternatives was offered. In both cases the campaign amounted to no more than a careerist competition, while truly important national issues were taken out of the realm of controversy and democratic decision. In both cases the election amounted to a deceptive mechanism for giving the nation the false feeling that it has a share in deciding its own destiny.

That's why the German election was no important event. It hardly justified the extensive coverage it received in the world's press. Whatever its results, the continuance of a provocative, bellicose policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was not at stake; nor was the extensive and speedy increase of German armament. . . . And America created West Germany in her own image, from rock'n'roll to politics.

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## ANTITHETICAL MIXTURE: PRADO AND PROGRESS

The pomp with which Manuel Prado, President of Peru, was received in Washington will educate the people of Latin America more than all our pious professions about the "Alliance for Progress." Few Americans are acquainted with the situation that prevails in Peru and with the interests which President Prado personifies.

Manuel Prado represents the most regressive latifundist traditions of Latin America which

U.S. investment interests are eager to perpetuate for all time. When he purports to speak for the Peruvian nation, he misrepresents a people that suffers from deprivation and illiteracy. The ones he truly represents are the small class of domestic plutocrats in close collusion with exploitive American copper interests. He is the spokesman of a regime that is neither of the people nor by the people nor for the people.

President Prado's endorsement of our Latin American policy weakens the popular appeal of that policy. The people of Latin America are sufficiently aware of the obstacles that block their development to look for no salvation from anything endorsed by "leaders" of Prado's ilk. Not that in "gaining" Prado's endorsement American "good intentions" were made to look bad. Rather, dubious intentions were exposed for what they truly are. No alliance becomes progressive merely because it calls itself so. The roads of progress are not those traveled by people like Manuel Prado.

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## A NEW INSTANCE OF "ADDING INSULT TO INJURY:"

When you shoot an East German border guard from across the frontier, and then lodge a protest with the Soviets against the shot border guard.

The most implausible assumption here is that some public announcement of the conditions of this macabre "game" would have to be made in advance. Otherwise, the first bombs to fall could not be discriminated from an accident. But announcement of intent would carry with it the possibility of total reprisal to an extent that would make the announcement itself impossible.

## THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM

Communication is probably the most crucial single factor making controlled war impossible. Without the complex systems which control modern weapons, decisions about firing would be made by individuals whose training and indoctrination have insulated them from any sense of their nation's economic objectives. Left to their own devices, after nuclear attack had cut off communication with central agencies, how could such men judge that the counterattack was to be part of a "limited" war pursued to secure economic advantage? The only "plan" they could be expected to elaborate under these circumstances would be the firing of all the arms they had at their disposal.

Loss of the New England transmitter that produces the very low frequency radio waves needed to communicate with Polaris submarines would make it likely that the 60 missiles now operational would leave for their preassigned targets. On each submarine the decision to fire would be made by only two men: the captain and the executive officer.

The 250 feet deep and one-half mile wide crater dug by a 10-megaton explosion would destroy even such communication systems as are buried in underground control posts. Destruction of Washington and the Omaha SAC base would shift control to the KC-135 command plane which is constantly aloft. What can we expect from the commander of this plane, who now has only his military ethics and indoctrination as a guide to action? Surely

his most likely response would be immediate retaliation with everything that survived of his force of 50 Atlas, 75 Jupiter, 60 Thor, 50 Snark, and 50 Houndog missiles and the 2500 bombers of SAC. The nuclear payloads of each of these missiles are 7, 3, 3, 10, and .5 megatons respectively, while each bomber carries 20 megatons.

Inadequate communication between the U.S. and the USSR and between the U.S. and its warning systems could contribute to the triggering of the holocaust. Accidental firing can occur through either mechanical or human failure. Malfunction of the detection systems (such as SAGE and BMEWS) or a psychotic firing officer on Matador or similar one-man controlled systems could send a nuclear warhead on its way. The lack of communication systems between Washington and Moscow, coupled with the existing deep mutual suspicion, make it quite possible that an accidental firing will start the final all-out conflict. And with expansion of the nuclear "club," the chances are increased of a catalytic war. If a third nation were to bomb New York, what chance is there that we would find out that the Russians were not responsible?

That mechanical failures are indeed possible was shown by the high level alert of October 5, 1960, which was called when radar echoes from the moon were mistaken for a squadron of high-flying missiles. Correction of the error was dangerously delayed when an iceberg severed the oceanic cable which is the communication link between Thule, Greenland (where the sighting was made) and the Omaha SAC. Interestingly enough, the first report of this incident appeared in the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. The GUARDIAN article gave the time of the false sighting as November. Questioned about this by American reporters, a SAC officer replied that "the only recent incident was October 5". (I. F. STONE WEEKLY, Dec. 16,

1960). His statement obviously implies that there have been other "incidents".

Nor should the "mad major" origin of accidents be discounted. Available statistics indicate that the psychotic breakdowns are about three times as frequent among military personnel as they are in the civilian population. That it is possible for military commanders to initiate attacks without the knowledge of the government has been demonstrated repeatedly. The bombing by 25 French planes of the Algerian border town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef was executed without the prior knowledge or consent of the French government.

The success of the Armed Forces' public relations campaign prevents the American people from sensing the outlook of the men who are likely to determine their fate. As soon as a war starts its direction is most likely to be entirely in military hands. In the event of nuclear attack, current plans are to airlift President Kennedy to the "secret" shelter near Camp Ritchie, Maryland — an operation estimated to require 2 hours. Meanwhile, other members of the government are to proceed there by car! In short, at this point the SAC control plane aloft and the captains and executive officers of the Polaris submarines will be the only ones planning U.S. "strategy". And men who are given prestige for exercising the arts of slaughter cannot be expected suddenly to grasp the method in political madness and embark upon a shrewd course of economic action. Nor can they be expected not to launch a retaliatory attack through feelings of humanity. The efficiency and indirectness of modern techniques of murder alienate the users of these techniques from their outcomes. To shoot a man with a bow and arrow is one thing, to push a button another. Only years after the Hiroshima raid could the pilot of the *Enola Gay* sleep without nightmares. Communication is always a problem; even communication with one's self.

# From READERS' LETTERS

## TO MOURN THE DEATH OF DECENCY

Thank you for your fine magazine. There is so much in it that one does not find in other publications.

I know that I am not alone among your readers in my feeling of hopelessness in the face of the present world situation. C. P. Snow has said that if the present arms race continues, with the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, it is a mathematical certainty that within 10 years there will be a nuclear holocaust either by accident or design. In a recent TV interview General Hester stated that if atomic weapons are given to West Germany, he is afraid that we will be at the point of no return without being able to avoid atomic destruction.

For 20 years I have done the usual: letters to Congressmen, newspapers, etc., walks for peace; contributions to worthwhile organizations. Despite hopelessness, I know that we must continue. Today, I made a black armband for myself. My plan is to start wearing it continuously in mourning for the obvious death of human decency, most recently evidenced by the renewal of atomic testing by Russia and my own country. Perhaps the idea will appeal to some of your readers. Or perhaps someone would like to share his or her suggestion for some other symbolic gesture. I am not a church goer (I attend Friends Meetings), but if at least one church in each town were to toll its bells in mourning at a certain hour or hours each day, this might serve as a constant reminder to all people.

San Jose, Calif.

Mrs. C. D. HORNING

## THE LIMITS OF AN ANALOGY

I recently subscribed to your publication and I am very happy I did. I also purchased the back issues of July and August 1961 so that I could read your article "For an American Alternative" and the letters in response to it.

I agree with your assumptions and analysis, and I am prepared to support your proposal to whatever extent possible for me personally. But let me mention one matter slightly disturbing to me in your article. You compare divergence of views between the U.S.S.R. and China to the lack of an opposition in the United States. Firstly, this is a comparison between two countries, and therefore a hardly fitting analogy. Secondly within each of these countries the very crusade you are calling for would undoubtedly be impossible — your publication would be suppressed and reach no one at all; and there would be a prison term for you, surely. I say all this because your publication says it stands for truth — and so do I. The basis of my views, personally, is by no means simple anti-Communism. But I could not refrain from pointing out the one noticeable flaw in your article.

I do not belong to any peace group, or any group at all. But I am prepared to participate in the activities of an organization as described in your article. I mean by contributions and perhaps active work. I am a former *New York Times* reporter and deskman. I still ply the editorial trade, but at present with a book publisher rather than a newspaper. I am not averse to performing any task, even menial, to help out in a sensible, honest peace effort.

I also wish to endorse Dr. Dodd's suggestion (October 1961 TMO) that you publish a book containing the most important TMO articles. Someone should undertake a systematic fund-raising drive for the publication of such a book. I pledge to contribute a reasonable amount, or perhaps more, and to purchase the book if the fund raising is not linked to a pre-publication offer of a free copy.

May we be granted strength and clear vision and the ability to act meaningfully and effectively in the face of our dangerous situation.

I am grateful to you for publishing *The Minority of One*.

Riverdale, N. Y.

MARVIN SCHWARTZ

## IN DEFENSE OF OPPOSITION TO R.O.T.C.

This letter is an answer to Mr. Grayford B. Gray's article "In Defense of R.O.T.C." (October, 1961 TMO), which was written as a refutation of my article in the *Collegian's Minority* of last June.

Gray asserts that the discipline in the R.O.T.C. is "notoriously lax." This could not be further from the truth. Cadets must keep their uniforms in spotless condition, they must salute every officer they pass and attend a weekly drill. Upon failure to do any of these things, they are subjected to strict disciplinary action. Anyway, however lax the R.O.T.C. discipline may be, this would not emerge from the R.O.T.C. objectives but at the most from failing to pursue them. It is a rather weak consolation that bad objectives are not fully reached.

When I wrote about the officer who reminded me of Hitler, I was attempting to make the point that our people too can be indoctrinated to obey orders blindly and thoughtlessly.

Gray goes on thinly to rationalize why R.O.T.C. cadets refused to sign petitions that expressed their convictions. I believe that there can be no doubt that only fear motivated these people who are being conditioned to automatic responses. Gray's argument that R.O.T.C. has no attraction for men of conviction may well be correct, but this is hardly a favorable testimonial about R.O.T.C.

I cannot fathom Gray's contention that the "fantastic efforts" of the John Birch Society prove that "it is not true that the 'average American lives in mortal terror of the communist menace.'" To me these efforts are an expression and a causative arm of that terror.

I am not a Communist, but I challenge Gray to show me how the Communist Party has ever publicly opposed our "traditionally conceived rights" any more than the U.S. Army and its R.O.T.C. have opposed them. As for action, the Communist Party is not less democratic than the Army which denies to its members all of our constitutionally guaranteed rights. Historically, the world Communist movement has not been more ruthless than the military of the U.S.

New York, N. Y.

ROGER SCHNEIER

## HARMONY IN DIVERSITY

I have been reading "From Readers' Letters" and deriving much pleasure therefrom. I believe that sentence in your Statement of Purpose which says that "our thoughts may collide, coincide or complement each other" provides a format for all of them.

One reader who, in the September issue, expresses the belief that your plan for an Alternative American Newspaper is merely a "side issue" goes on to say that world government is the solution to all our problems. Doesn't he realize that many, many more people must arrive at this conclusion before it can possibly materialize? Which came first — the chicken or the egg, or, how does anything begin to appear in creation? Many minds must first accept world government.

Since I began reading TMO, my thoughts have often collided, coincided and complemented those of others. Like the reader who voted for Kennedy to beat Nixon out. I wonder how many did just that. I did. It seems ridiculous in retrospect, but it took time to percolate the idea through my mind that by not voting, which in essence is a protest vote, opposition is manifest. I rebelled, but did remain a minority of one.

Eldridge, Calif.

A. J. ANDRAE

## A FATHER HOPES HIS SON'S MIND WILL BE PERVERTED

The September, 1961 issue of TMO is great! It pains me however to see how difficult it is for my parents and friends to believe "The Manufactured Crisis." My father says that in 10 years I will be able to see through that kind of talk and refuses to discuss the problem intelligently. I shall try to fight as you do. I have many moments of depression and no hope, but you and your work stand before me as a lesson that hope is in work and devotion. Thanks for being as you are.

Avon Lake, Ohio

DOUGLAS KORTY

## WHAT COMPLIMENTS!

Your paper was written in the same involved obscure jargon which college professors and government bureaucrats (sic) use to impress each other. In general your publication seems to have a great many sacred cows of its (sic) own and to be written by a bunch of self important humorless fatheads. Please don't feel hurt when you find no check for a subscription enclosed.

Los Angeles, Calif.

JACK BUCHANAN

## A BOOKLET WILL DO . . .

A new daily newspaper, if it is to contain all the features offered by competitors, cannot survive without substantial advertising revenue. This you will not get because it is under the control of the conservative elements.

I would like to suggest something that is more practical: a national campaign to widely circulate, and stimulate discussion of, an effective booklet — one that would point out the urgency of the present crisis and the danger of a nuclear war. It should also suggest an affirmative alternative program especially for the transition to a peaceful economy.

The cost of marketing a new soap, cigarette or nail polish may run into millions of dollars. Usually it is a competitive item, without special merit. It must overcome "sales resistance." Our product, the booklet, is a valuable one, beneficial to every American except the few who profit from militarization. Nearly all help require, in the projected campaign would be free. There should be little trouble raising funds for printing the initial 50,000 copies to get the campaign rolling. Properly organized, this booklet could be put into five million homes and become a central topic of conversation.

Beverly Hills, Calif.

IRVING H. FLAMM

(Mr. Flamm is a retired corporation lawyer, the author of many articles on social and economic topics, and in 1940 had his book, *An Economic Program for a Living Democracy*, published.)

## "DEAR MAJORITY OF INFINITY."

The clarity and trenchance of your recent issues deserves more than special praise!

New York, N. Y.

DON DEKOVEN

(Mr. deKoven is an arts-and-science writer.)

## THE NEED OF AN ALTERNATIVE

I have just finished reading my first copy of your monthly and wish to congratulate you on your effort and the type of publication you have produced.

An "American Alternative" is sorely needed in our nation today. I have at times been nearly amused by the illusions presented as truth by the Paper-and-Air-Wave Curtain. I feel that it is high time to challenge this corruption.

California, Pa.

KENNETH V. MURRAY

## AN ACT OF CONSCIENCE

My conscience has finally directed me toward helping in the continuation of your excellent publication — in a monetary way. The eminent importance of your subject matter and the truthful, straightforward presentation makes TMO tower above the majority of publications as a center and source of honest presentation of the world events.

Arcadia, Calif.

(Mrs.) LINDA HOPKINS

## SEEKING TRUTH AND PEN PALS . . .

It is refreshing to read your enlighteningly humanistic analyses of present hysteric, unstable and threatening events. Your factual presentation will bring forth fruitful results. We all need our dignity restored and truth introduced into our shabby world.

I am a widow of 65, and would appreciate pen pals from among similar-minded widows.

621 Avalon Avenue

Santa Rosa, Calif.

FREDA JAY

## CONTEMPLATING EMIGRATION

I am a 32-year old graduate of Santa Barbara State College with a major in journalism, a veteran of 4 years service as a paid stooge of the U.S. Army in Europe including 17 months in Berlin, and an ardent supporter of all peace movements.

I have read, for the first time, an issue (August 1961) of TMO and I wish to extend to you sincere thanks for such a breath of fresh air in this stifling suffocating heat of the modern intellectual U.S. desert. I agree with everything you write. I just don't know how to express how glad I was to come across your magazine.

I have become almost totally disillusioned with the America I know, feeling now that this country with its reckless Pentagon paranoias bears about 90% of the responsibility for the present danger of a war of annihilation. Because of my unpopular views I have been alienated from and ostracized by my former "friends" to the point of being threatened with physical violence. I have almost reached the point where I do not know where to turn, and have contemplated leaving this country to its own fate and emigrating elsewhere in search for humanity and sanity. I talk to many who feel the same way. However, we are not organized. Is there any hope in this 11th hour, in the fall of 1961 — possibly the last fall anyone now living will know, to reverse the catastrophic trend?

I wish to offer my services and skills to you and your venture in whatever capacity I may be of service.

Santa Barbara, Calif.

MERLE L. HOVLAND

## BOTH SIDES OF EVENTS . . .

My wife and I agree with what you are trying to do and know that you have a big job on your hands. Genuine both sides of the events is something which the people of the U.S. really need.

Beirut, Lebanon

G. EDWIN GARDNER

## "A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES"

Please allow me to congratulate you on your October, 1961 issue of TMO. Your analysis of "Soviet Guilt vs. American 'Innocence'" is a masterpiece. The repugnance many of us felt when the Soviets began to test again was certainly not offset when the U.S. Government resumed tests itself.

Because you have the political "guts" to say "a plague on both of your houses" does certainly not mean that TMO does not propose a useful third course. Again allow me to congratulate you for proposing a National Alternative.

Brooklyn, N. Y.

PHILIP ABBOT LUCE

(Mr. Luce is a contributor to many magazines.)

## FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

We have been requested to bring to the attention of our readers that Dr. John Swomley, whose "Berlin: Background of a Crisis" appeared in the September issue of TMO, is the Foreign Affairs Consultant of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. The aforementioned article also appeared in *Current Events*, a regular periodical published by the Fellowship. Dr. Swomley serves as its editor. The mailing address of the Fellowship of Reconciliation is: Box 271, Nyack, N. Y.

We wish to congratulate Dr. Stuart Kabnick, a devoted friend of *The Minority of One*, on the occasion of his being cited by the *Conseil International de Medecine et de Biologie* in France for his contributions to the healing arts, and on his election as director, representing North America, to the executive board of the Council International. Among Dr. Kabnick's scientific contributions is the discovery of Cabasil and cancer research.

The feature "The Collegian's Minority," reserved for contributions by students has been omitted from this issue due to lack of space.

Prof. Ernest Z. Zeisler's column, "To Set the Record Straight" will be resumed upon his return from Europe, hopefully in the forthcoming issue of TMO.

A TMO sound film is available at \$10 rental. The "movie stars" are Dr. and Mrs. Linus Pauling, the Editor of TMO and Mrs. Arnoni. They are involved in a spontaneous discussion of peace issues as well as of the nature and goals of *The Minority of One*. It is a 16 mm., 15-minute film. You may wish to show it in your home, to civic groups and church memberships.

## THE PUBLISHERS OF THIS ISSUE

The following individuals have made it possible through membership fees in The Friends of The Minority of One, sponsorship and sporadic donations, gift subscriptions, and bulk purchases of copies for promotional distribution received during September 1961 for us to continue publication:

Dr. Stuart Kabnick—\$105, Costa Chitouras—\$100, G. S.—\$100, M. Allen Greenwood, M.D.—\$100, Martin Hird—\$100, Dr. and Mrs. Linus Pauling—\$100, Annot Jacob and Louise Samoiloff—\$50, Mrs. Philip B. Stern—\$30, Dolores Elliot—\$25, G. P.—\$25, L. W.—\$25, M. J. Janoff—\$20, Nordin L. Larson—\$20, Otto W. Modley—\$20, Andrew Solberg—\$20, Nicola T. and Walton B. Geiger—\$14.50, Robert Grossman—\$14, Dr. David Margolis—\$12, Mr. and Mrs. Earl Price—\$12, F. A.—\$10, A. J. Andrae—\$10, Edmund C. Berkeley—\$10, Dr. R. F. Burlingame—\$10, Mrs. A. Henry Cuneo—\$10, Irving H. Flamm, Esq.—\$10, Margo Mackusick—\$10, Mary Phillips—\$10, Albert A. Sanders, Esq.—\$10, John W. Metcalf—\$8.20, Elmer Segal, Esq.—\$8.00, Inge Uppman—\$6, H. and A. J. B.—\$5, Walter E. Beale—\$5, Annemarie Bergman—\$5, Roy E. Coupal—\$5, Julian C. Dewell—\$5, Mary C. Eubanks—\$5, E. E. Garlits—\$5, Hannah Green—\$5, Elmer K. Hansen—\$5, Mrs. Arvin E. Klemme—\$5, Fritz Mishler—\$5, Mr. and Mrs. James L. Perkins—\$5, Irvin Prushan—\$5, Earl Robinson—\$5, F. R. Scott—\$5, Ruth Vollmer—\$5, Roxie Wood—\$5, Grace Contrino—\$4, Mrs. Florence Hornig—\$4, Richard E. Joyce—\$4, Harry Kraft—\$4, Judith Lewis—\$4, Mrs. John T. Mikes—\$4, Lulu W. Draper—\$3, Mr. and Mrs. John G. Frost—\$3, Roger Schneider—\$3, Manuel Machado—\$2, Rockwell B. Schaefer—\$2, Diana Schatz—\$2, Carl S. Tobie—\$2, and Roy W. Savage—\$1.

TOTAL \$1,131.70



# A Candid Report

The response to our appeals for funds to enable us to launch a promotional campaign for the achievement of solvency has been greatly disappointing. Of the total of \$1,131.70 received during the month of September, well over 50% had been directly solicited by us from several devoted friends of this publication. The spontaneous offers of financial help have lately decreased sharply.

This is hardly surprising if we consider that the circle of donors to our publication fund has always been a small one. Most of those who have expressed enthusiasm for THE MINORITY OF ONE have not yet made the financial effort upon which the continuance of this publication depends.

Unless funds are available in the immediate future, we will not be able to proceed with the execution of the plans that would render further appeals for financial support unnecessary. The publication of each issue would then continue to be under a question mark and to depend upon a perpetual materialization of "angels." If we are to break this vicious circle, we must be substantially helped in our efforts by those individuals who consider the continuance of THE MINORITY OF ONE to be important.

In addition to donations to our publication fund and gift subscriptions, you can help us, both financially and promotionally, by purchasing copies of back issues in bulk and distributing them to prospective subscribers. Such copies are available at the nominal charge of \$15 per 100.

As soon as the forthcoming, December, issue is released, permanent bound volumes of our 1961 issues will be made available at \$10. These will include a complete annual index. We will also make available a limited number of bound volumes of our December, 1959—December, 1960 issues at \$10. Since the number of volumes we can provide is limited, we advise those interested to place their orders and to send their remittance now.

And most of all, help us before we can no longer be helped . . .  
—Ed.

## MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIES IN THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE

Life Friends	contributing	\$1,000
Sponsoring Friends	"	\$ 500
Sustaining Friends	"	\$ 250
Supporting Friends	"	\$ 100
Contributing Friends	"	\$10-50 per year

## The Friends of the Minority of One Statement of Purpose

Man's eternal quest for ever more rewarding and social experiences of living is challenged by the prevailing danger of still another war. Posing the greatest physical peril to the human species in its entire history, another world war would bring final defeat to man's ambition to evolve a high spiritual, intellectual and social content. Without such a content the phenomenon of living would be void of purpose and justification.

Anti-war sentiments are as old as war itself. Their failure, up to now, to eliminate war dramatizes how serious and ominous are the obstacles in the path of those who see no task greater than the prevention of war. If we are to succeed, where other generations have failed, we must master the ability of unbiased thinking about the issues that divide mankind; we must reject nationalistic prejudice and rationalizations that perpetuate two antagonistic camps of nations, each self-righteously identifying the other as the villain. Honest self-criticism, unadulterated by national favoritism, is therefore a national virtue on which world peace itself may hinge. The individual's part in this is to assert himself intellectually, socially and politically. Unless he rejects the hypnotic influences of a totalitarian mass psychology, he renders himself incapable of acting for the preservation of peace.

The sole and ultimate purpose of all the activities of THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE will be to contribute to the preservation of peace everywhere. The activities of THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE will address themselves to social problems directly or ultimately weighing in the balance of war and peace.

THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE, as a foundation, has no specific political message and no loyalty other than peace and all that serves peace, specifically including independence of thought. You and I are the minorities of one if only we do not fear our thoughts. Our thoughts may collide, or they may coincide or complement each other, but even then let us each remain a minority of one.

True to this tenet, neither membership in nor activities on behalf of THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE will indicate an explicit or implicit endorsement of individual views expressed in any publications the foundation might sponsor.

THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE will sponsor the magazine *The Minority of One* and such publishing and public activities as will serve the preservation of peace. The editor of *The Minority of One*, M.S. Arnoni, will retain full editorial independence.

For these lofty goals we call on men and women everywhere to join the ranks of THE FRIENDS OF THE MINORITY OF ONE and to support sincerely our efforts on behalf of peace.

Prof. Daniel M. Berman  
Bishop Clarence E. Duffy, D.D.  
W. H. Ferry  
Rev. Stephen H. Frithman  
Dr. Stuart Kabnick  
Ava Helen Pauling  
Prof. Linus Pauling  
Prof. Ernest B. Zisler

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☐ I further suggest you mail free sample copies to the individuals listed by me separately.

## Of What I Am Ashamed:

► OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT for reconsidering its promise to help finance the Volta River dam-smelter project in Ghana as punishment for Ghana's refusal to support the American propaganda assault against the Soviet Union as the "only offender" with regard to nuclear tests.

► OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA, FLA., for succumbing to the pressure of John Birch Society elements and for firing Professor Thomas P. Hardeman for the "sin" of his genuinely democratic convictions.

► OF THE U.S. ARMY IN GERMANY for further aggravating the international situation by instituting its armed patrols on the highway between West Germany and West Berlin which runs through the territory of the German Democratic Republic.

► OF THE U.S. FOURTH ARMY for co-sponsoring a civilian-military political seminar in San Antonio, Texas and thereby converting itself in effect into an ultra-conservative political party:

► OF THE MANY U.S. GOVERNMENT AND STATE AGENCIES which sponsored a nation-wide hysteria of building nuclear "shelters", which can save nothing but the profits of "shelter" racketeers.

► OF THE CECIL COUNTY, MD., AUTHORITIES for jailing three Negroes, Juanita and Wallace F. Nelson and Rose Robinson for the "crime" of wishing to be served in a segregated restaurant and for committing them to a hospital for the mentally ill when they proclaimed a hunger strike.

► OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES for allocating funds for the printing of 36,000 additional copies of the falsified "report" entitled "The Communist-Led Riots Against the House Committee on Un-American Activities in San Francisco, California, May 12-14, 1960."

► OF THE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE for editing its report on the expense accounts of Congressmen in a way which obscures misuse of public funds.

► OF ROGER M. BLOUGH, chairman of the U.S. Steel Corporation, for pushing ahead with plans to raise the prices of steel.

► OF GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER for publicly lying to the effect that no plans for an invasion of Cuba had been made before he left the presidential office.

► OF THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT for upholding the new Sunday closing law.

► OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD for demanding the ouster of Ralph K. White, chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the U.S. Information Agency's Office of Research and Analysis, for the "sin" of maintaining that not all evil is confined to and employed by the Soviets.

► OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY for appointing William C. Foster, a life-long expert on and devotee to armaments, as the first Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

pro forma recognition of American disarmament intentions, which in fact are non-existent, to mislead no one. International opinion is quite unanimous on this subject. Its only division is between those who recognize the American responsibility for the arms race and are critical of it, and those who recognize it and are in favor of it. This latter category includes most Americans.

Washington's disdain of the recent Belgrade conference of the neutrals was illustrated by comments to the effect that the mildness of the criticism of the Soviets was due to the neutrals' fear of Moscow. Nothing could be further from the truth. In actuality, the neutrals' position was due to their knowledge that the Soviet nuclear tests, reprehensible as they are, do not in any way shift the responsibility for the prevailing arms race from the United States.

The punitive policy of the Kennedy Administration vis-a-vis those neutral powers which refused collusion with Washington's propaganda offensive is hardly a remedy. The announced disqualification for foreign aid of those governments which retain their integrity in evaluating the international situation is an attempted intimidation which will hardly produce the results the President hopes for. Here and there one government or another may be intimidated and more hesitant to tell the world what it truly thinks. But such American "success" is bound to be shortlived. You just cannot fool all of the people all of the time, and any policy that does not accept this premise is headed for disappointment. On the other hand, attempts to coerce the neutrals into giving up even their intellectual integrity will inadvertently provoke resentment. Instead of shutting the neutrals up, they will provide a further confirmation that their suspicions are well justified.

The American-Soviet statement of disarmament principles and President Kennedy's recent address before the United Nations General Assembly did not alleviate world misgivings and suspicions. On the contrary, both statement and speech sound so fantastic, so unbelievably beautiful and unrealistically well-intentioned as to confirm the international instinct that American official pronouncements provide no guide of American intentions and motivations.

No one was ever so successful as Mr. Kennedy in squeezing into a single speech so many testimonies in favor of motherhood. The fictional America in whose name he addressed the nations of the world stands for everything that is good and opposes nothing but unequivocal evil. So holy and so virtuous was Mr. Kennedy's self-portrait and so utopian the world as molded by America, that no one was surprised by his determination to "defend" all these blessings "by whatever means," including, of course, the nuclear chastity belt.

The American test of sincerity in striving toward general and complete disarmament remains in the economic domain. No verbal professions, however sanctimonious, can obscure the fact that our Administration has not launched any program for fundamental preliminaries of disarmament; or, any search for a peaceful base for the national economy. In the absence of such a program, our pronouncements may acquire more or less seeming verisimilitude but they cannot truly be sincere.

Whatever passing economic, partisan and propagandistic "gains" have accrued from Mr. Kennedy's handling of the Berlin problem, the global result is a situation in which we are "armed for peace or war." The vicious circle implied by this slogan is a universal tragedy. In order to remain "armed for peace," pretexts must be created. These pretexts may be expressed in words, but they are not mere words. They amount to continuous diplomatic crises, any of which may push us over the brink.

Sept. 26, 1961

## To Talk Is Not Necessarily to Negotiate

(Continued from Page 1)

Berlin to have us "Armed for Peace and War," as an editorial in the WASHINGTON POST put it. He has used the uniformed military cadres absorbing America's unemployed as arteries of fiscal injections that preserve the nation's economic system.

The Kennedy Administration's attempt is even more comprehensive. The Soviets were successfully maneuvered into accepting a disproportionate part of the blame for the resumption of nuclear tests. Now American newspapers and politicians who for so long urged the resumption of such tests can shed crocodile tears over every bit of radiated debris with which the Soviets are polluting the atmosphere. Their voices were never heard in protest against the much greater extent of air poisoning perpetrated by the United States up to the end of 1958. The criminal parity the Soviet Union seems determined to achieve with the United States in polluting the atmosphere is suddenly

misrepresented by our Administration, from the President on down, as if it were the original nuclear sin.

Another propaganda "gain" was scored by the Kennedy Administration when it went on record as endorsing general and complete disarmament.

On the surface, the document signed by John J. McCloy and Valerian A. Zorin provided an occasion for celebration. Had it not been an instrument so obviously signed in bad faith, it would be of historic importance. It would be naive however to expect that a sincerely intended document of that nature could emerge at the very height of a mutual show of "toughness."

The Soviets, in acquiescing in the U.S. Government's appearance as an equal in seeking complete international disarmament, have displayed confidence in the intelligence of international public opinion. They rely on such